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INTRODUCTION
The historical idealistic basis of an American community of
nations is posited upon the belief that the New World was to be
dedicated to liberty, democracy, and peace, in contrast to the mon-
archy, tyranny, and belligerency which prevailed in the old.' Since
the earliest days of American independence, her leaders have called
for respect for and protection of those complementary aspects of
democracy-popular constitutional government and human rights.
Henry Clay in 1820 and again in 1821 appealed for a hemispheric
system to serve as "a rallying point of human wisdom against all
the despotism of the Old World," and as "a sort of counterpoise to
the holy alliance... in favor of national independence and liberty."'
Bolivar, in the 1826 Treaty of Union, League and Perpetual Con-
federation, would sanction any state which deserted the republican
form of government by expulsion from the proposed inter-American
organization. A continental citizenship was also to be established,
and slavery in the Americas was to be abolished.' Pedro Felix Vicufia
of Chile wrote in 1837 that a hemispheric union should be estab-
lished to support popular revolutions against tyrannical govern-
ments.4 Later, Juan Bautista Alberdi, then a refugee in Chile from
Argentine dictatorship, maintained that intervention should be uti-
lized to promote democratic governments in the Americas.5
Despite these and other declarations for a continent of liberty,
declarations which were to be made over and over again in the forth-
coming years, demands for specific and clear-cut protection of hu-
man rights through the medium of Pan America were not to be
heard until the end of World War II. Throughout most of the con-
tinent, dictatorship had become the rule, democracy the exception,
and with dictatorship came a consequent drastic deprivation of
fundamental rights and freedoms. This pattern had repeated itself
over and over again in every age from Rosas, Lopez, and Santa Ana
to the even bloodier regimes of Gomez, Ubico, and Trujillo down
1 A. WHITAKER, THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDEA chs. I, II (1954).
2 Id. at 32.
3 See Treaty of Perpetual Union, League, and Confederation between the Repub-
lics of Colombia, Central America, Peru, and the United Mexican States, July 15,
1826, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES 1889-1928, at xix-xx (J.Scott ed. 1931). Article 29 of this treaty provides for exclusion if any of the parties
should change its present form of government. Since the nations were all obstensiblypossessed of a republican form of government it follows that substantial departure
from the republican form would mean exclusion.
4 Id. arts. 23, 24, 27.
5 R. Burr & R. Hussey, DOCUMENTS ON INTER-AMERICAN COOPERATION, 1810-1881, at Nos. 19, 23 (1955). Tabar of Ecuador and President Wilson were also advo-
cates of multilateral protection of democracy in the hemisphere. See A.J. THOMAS,
JR. & A.V.W. THomAs, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 216-17 (1963) [here-
inafter cited as THOmAS AND THOMAS].
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to the present era. Today, we are presented with a spectacle of in-
creasing numbers of military governments in leading South Ameri-
can states that should be well on the way to democracy.
Perhaps as a result of this dominance of military dictatorships,
it was not until 1945 that human rights became of inter-American
concern. At the Mexico City Conference on War and Peace, the
Chapultepec Conference,' Guatemala demanded that collective non-
recognition be used as a weapon against anti-democratic govern-
ments on the ground that such regimes endangered the peace and
solidarity of the hemisphere and were the primary cause for the
denial of the rights of man.' This proposal was sidetracked and ulti-
mately forgotten.8 Collective action against the internal regime of a
fellow American state would conflict with the most sacrosanct prin-
ciple of the Americas-the doctrine of non-intervention. Instead of
the Guatemalan proposal, the conference adopted a weak resolution
on International Protection for the Rights of Man.
9 It declared
adherence to those international law principles for the safeguarding
of essential human rights and vaguely supported a system of inter-
national protection for these rights. Strangely, the resolution was
not really made for the enlightened purpose of protecting human
rights as such. Rather, it rested upon the assumption that protec-
tion of human rights was needed to eliminate diplomatic protection
of citizens abroad and the intervention which had resulted there-
from. Thus, human rights and their protection were again placed
in an inferior position to principles of sovereignty and non-inter-
vention.
After the Mexico City conference, a doctrine was formulated
by Eduardo Rodriguez Laretta, Foreign Minister of Uruguay.
0 He
followed Emanuel Kant's theory by equating international peace
with a republican form of government for all states." Rodriguez
6 P.A.U. INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE, MEXiCO
CITY, REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE GOVERNING BOARD OF THE PAN AMERICAN UNION 
BY
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL (Feb. 21-Mar. 8, 1945, Cong. and Conf. Series No. 47 1945).
7 See P.A.U. HANDBOOK FOR DELEGATES TO THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
oF AMERICAN STATES 88-89 (1947).
S Resolution XXXVIII, "Defense and Preservation of Democracy in America,"
P.A.U. supra note 6. On the conflict between intervention and human rights see M.
Ball, Issue for the Americas, 15 INT'L ORG. 21 (1961).
9 Resolution XL, P.A.U., supra note 6.
10 P.A.U. CONSULTATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF URUGUAY AND REPLIES OF THE
GOVERNMENTS ON THE PARALLELISM BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND PEACE, THE 
INTER-
NATIONAL RIGHTS OF MAN AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN DEFENSE OF THOSE 
PRINCIPLES
(May, 1946). [hereinafter cited as P.A.U.].
11 Although Kant laid down a doctrine of non-intervention he qualified it by
his statement that the civil constitution in every state shall be republican. Thus, he
believed that world peace could only be maintained if and when the republican form
of government bad become universal. For a statement of this thesis of Kant, see K.
LowEwsTIN, POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 17-20 (1946). In A. HERSHEY, ESSENTIALS
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Laretta called for collective intervention to assure democracy in the
Americas. "Peace," he said, "is safe only where democratic prin-
ciples of government prevail." He added that action to assure demo-
cracy "is really nothing more than the fulfillment of obligations
freely assumed by the American republics, all of whom have pro-
claimed at inter-American conferences their devotion to democracy
and the rights of man."' 2 The Laretta Doctrine was rejected by the
majority of American governments, although over one-third did ex-
press approval of its contents." Objections covered several points.
It was argued that it was often difficult to categorize a particular
government as democratic or non-democratic; and that no nation
could ever live up to the utopian ideals of democracy; and that
democracy could not always be equated with peace, for democratic
governments had on occasion constituted major threats to peace.' 4
THE CHARTER OF THE OAS
When the American Republicans met in 1948 in conference at
Bogota to reconstitute the inter-American system, they had before
them the previously accepted Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (The Rio Treaty). In its preamble, this treaty affirmed
''as a manifest truth ... that peace is founded on justice and moral
order and consequently on the protection of human rights and free-
dom."' 5 This language can hardly be understood as creating a
legal obligation on the part of the American republics to maintain
essential human rights within their respective borders. Moreover, the
treaty provided no sanctions or measures of enforcement to be taken
against a state violating human rights.
There was strong sentiment at Bogoti to remedy this failure
through the creation of an inter-American norm for the respect of
human rights. Power would be granted to the inter-American sys-
tem, now to be called the Organization of American States (OAS),
to enforce the norm.'6 An opposing view prevailed,'17 however. Thus,
OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND ORGANIZATION 243 n.18 (1935) the author claims
that Kant in "Essay on Perpetual Peace" published in 1795 was first to state the
principle of non-intervention. Hershey fails to mention the fact that Kant's prohibi-
tion of interventions might be considered as modified by his statement that the civil
constitution in every state should be republican.
12 P.A.U., supra note 10.
13 Id.
14 Id. Selte-Camaro Filho, A Douttina Larreta, 3 BOLETIm DA SOcnMDADE DE
DIREITO INTERNACIONAL 18 (1946).
15 On the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance see P.A.U., INTER-
AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY,
RIO DE JANEIRO, REPORT ON RESULTS OF CONFERENCE SUBMITTED TO THE GovEmINO
BOARD OF THE PAN AMERICAN UNION BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL (1947)16 PA.U. INTER-A ERICAN JuxmIcAL ComMITTEE REPORT ON THE INTER-AmER-
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the Charter, the basic constitutional instrument of the OAS, set
forth rather general and idealistic statements as human rights.
American solidarity was declared to be founded upon liberty and
social justice."8 In a statement of principles, "the fundamental
rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality,
creed or sex" were proclaimed. 9 Language of a legally binding
character was used, however, in Article 13 of the Charter which
reads as follows:
Each state has the right to develop its cultural, political and economic
life freely and naturally. In this free development, the state shall re-
spect the rights of the individual and the principles of universal moral-
ity.20
Use of the word "shall" in Article 13 appears to impose a legal
obligation upon the members, but the rights of the individual to be
respected and maintained are not delineated, and the additional
duty imposed to respect the principles of universal morality is vague
indeed, smacking of natural law. Moreover, the organization was
not empowered to see that each nation lived up to the obligation of
Article 13.
States demanding inter-American protection of human rights
were not content with these generalized proclamations. At their insis-
tence, a resolution was adopted entitled the "American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man" which constituted the first com-
prehensive statement of continental human rights.2' Unfortunately,
the declaration can be considered only as a statement of aims and
hopes. It was not the intent of its authors to create a legally binding
hemispheric bill of rights.
The rights listed in the declaration are extensive. Some are of a
political nature while others are economic and social. Still others
can hardly be classified as rights. They are ethical aspirations. As
the title of the resolution indicates, the declaration also concerns
itself with the "duties" of man, stating: "the fulfillment of duty by
each individual is a prerequisite to the rights of all."2 "Rights and
icAN CouNcm oF JuRisTs cONCERNING RESOLUTION XXXI oF Ta CONFERENCE oF
BOGOTA 2 (1949).
17 The opposing group argued that the Charter was in the nature of a constitu-
tional instrument and should be confined to the establishment of the OAS and the
functions of its organs. All other inter-American policies should be set up in separate
agreements. NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES, REPORT OF THE
DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RELATED DOCUMENTS, DEPT. OF STATE PUB.
3263, at 13 (1948).
18 O.A.S. CHARTER preamble.
19 O.A.S. CHARTER art. 5(j).
20 O.A.S. CHARTER art. 13. (Italics supplied)
21 Final Act, Resolution XXX, as contained in NINTn INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF AMERICAi STATES, supra note 17, at 260.
22 Preamble, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. For discus-
1972]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
duties are interrelated in every social and political activity of man."
The duties of man are roughly classified into social duties, political
duties, and economic duties. Underlying the inclusion of duties is
the thought that each individual should recognize that he owes cer-
tain responsibilities to the society in which he lives, and that stress
should not be placed solely upon the responsibility of the state to
secure human rights. Nevertheless, one may question the utility of
including such a concept in an international declaration, for the
whole basic theory of the protection of human rights on the inter-
national level is that individuals can be easily overwhelmed before
the aggregate collection of power lodged in a state. A sovereign state,
on the other hand, still retains its power to exact from all individuals
the duties which are owed to it.23
HUMAN RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY
No powers are given to the OAS to enforce respect for funda-
mental rights and freedoms in a state departing from the norm. Still,
proposals have been made, and, in certain cases, collective action
has been taken, which would, or did, permit the cat to be skinned.
Inter-American protection of human rights through collective action
rests upon the foundation that outrageous violations of human values
by an American state will result in a threat to the peace of the
hemisphere. By the terms of the Rio Treaty, collective measures
may be taken against an American state which threatens or breaches
the peace of the hemisphere or which commits an aggression so as
to endanger the territory or the political independence of another
American state. 4 Therefore, a state which violates human rights so
as to threaten the peace of the Americas may be subjected to the
collective enforcement measures of the Rio Treaty. Here is a return
to the thought of Kant and Laretta-a parallelism is found between
democracy and respect for human rights on the one hand and peace
on the other.
This idea found expression again in 1959 at the Fifth Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which was called to
consider problems of political unrest in the Caribbean and the effec-
tive exercise of representative democracy in the hemisphere.25 At-
tributes of a democratic regime were set forth by the meeting's
sion of the rights and duties delineated see THOmAS AND THi£oAs, supra note 5, at
224-27.
23 THOMAS AND THoMAS, supra note 5, at 226.
24 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance at arts. 3, 6. See also THOmaS
AND TOiOMAS, supra note 5, at ch. XV.25 See 41 DEPT. STATE BULL. 342-44 (1959). On the background of the Santiago
Meeting, see id. at 279 et seq.
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Declaration of Santiago.26 These included freedom of the press, radio,
television, and, in general, freedom of information and expression.
The American governments were called upon to ensure a system of
freedom for the individual and social justice based on respect for
fundamental human rights. They were also asked to protect by
effective judicial procedures those human rights contained in domes-
tic legislation."
The declaration thus recognized the relationship between re-
spect for human rights, fundamental freedom, and representative
democracy on the one hand and inter-American peace and harmony
on the other. It was noted that failure to adhere to the principles of
democracy is "a source of widespread disturbance and gives rise to
emigration that causes frequent grave political tensions between
the state the emigres leave and the state that receives them."2
Political tensions and emigration are by no means new to Latin
America. The common denominator of political life in the Latin
American republics has long been the presence of internal revolu-
tionary disturbances as rivals have competed for political power.
Losing parties are the "outs" and the "outs" are not only out of
power, but they are often also out of the country. This is frequently
the healthier course of action inasmuch as the "ins" have, in many
instances, found it convenient to put the remaining "outs" out of
the way in such a manner as to constitute a gross denial of human
rights. Once out of the country, the "outs" conspire to return so as
to overthrow those in power, the "ins." Such conspiracies and move-
ments aimed at the overthrow of the "ins" have on countless occa-
sions boiled over to embroil the government of the state to which
the "outs" have emigrated, either because the government of such
state is in sympathy with the "outs" and aids them overtly or
covertly in their endeavors to stir up civil strife, or because such
government fails to use due diligence to prevent such rebellious
activities. Thus, a threat or even a breach of the peace comes to pass
in the form of an indirect or vicarious aggression-as called by Dr.
Schwarzenberger, an aggression by proxy.29
In 1960, the Inter-American Peace Committee followed the
Declaration of Santiago by finding hemispheric tensions and threats
to peace in the flagrant denial of human rights and lack of represen-
tative democracy by the despotic Trujillo regime in the Dominican
Republic. After investigation of the situation in the Dominican
Republic, the committee found in that country denial of freedom of
26 Declaration of Santiago, 41 DEPT. STATE BuLL. 343 (1959).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 G. SCHIWARZENBERGER, FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (1962).
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speech and assembly, arbitrary arrest, cruel and inhuman treatment
of prisoners, and the use of intimidation and terror as political
weapons. 80 International tensions in the Caribbean were said by the
committee to be aggravated by these violations of human rights and
it was believed that such tensions would continue to increase so long
as these violations persisted.81
A short time later, U.S. Secretary of State Herter, taking his
cue from the committee, sought application of the principle. The
Sixth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, acting under the Rio
Treaty, was convened in August, 1960, to consider charges of aggres-
sion by the Dominican Republic against Venezuela.82 Finding com-
plicity of the Trujillo regime in an attempt on the life of Venezuela's
president, the meeting agreed that the enforcement measures of the
Rio Treaty should be applied against the Dominican Republic. The
measures authorized by the consultative meeting were an immediate
and collective break of diplomatic relations and a collective partial
interruption of economic relations.
Although agreeing that the Dominican Republic had committed
serious acts against Venezuelan sovereignty warranting condemna-
tion, Secretary of State Herter expressed doubt that sanctions were
the best means to bring the Dominican Republic back into the inter-
American fold. Harking back to the Inter-American Peace Com-
mittee's previous report which would link aggression and threats to
the peace with denials of democracy and human rights, he sought
OAS supervision of free elections in the Dominican Republic after
a period of free expression and free assembly. If the OAS were
refused the right to supervise by the Dominican Republic, then
strong measures under the Rio Treaty could and should have been
taken.8" Here then was an effort to enforce democracy and human
rights against a member state in violation of community principles.
This OAS political trusteeship for an American nation received very
little enthusiasm. Other American republics believed the OAS not to
be so empowered and therefore viewed it as collective intervention
of an illegal nature in the internal affairs of the Dominican Re-
public."4 Immediate measures under the Rio Treaty were favored
and voted.
30 Case presented by Venezuela relating to violations of human rights in the
Dominican Republic (February 1960), P.A.U. INTER-AMERICAN PEACE COMMITTEE,
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN PEACE COMMITTEE TO THE SECOND SPECIAL INTER-
AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COnMITTEE SINCE THE TENTH
INTER-AmERICAN CONFERENCE 1954-1969, at 24-26 (OEA/Ser.l.iii.ii 10, English, 1965).
81 Id. at 26.
32 P.A.U. APPLICACIONES DEL TRATADO INTERAMERICANO DE AsIsTENCIA RECIPROCA
1948-1960, at 393 et. seq. (1960).
33 43 DEPT. STATE BuLu. 355-58 (1960).
84 See THOMAs AND THOMAS, supra note 5, at 236.
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There is difficulty in upholding the legality of an imposed OAS
political trusteeship upon an American Republic under existing OAS
instruments. A state's free acceptance of such a trusteeship and
supervision of elections would create no problem. Moreover, in an
instance similar to the Dominican Republic case, when the delin-
quent nation has been found to have committed an aggression
against which measures can be legally taken, those measures might
be delayed or withheld on condition that the state would accept the
offer of a political trusteeship. Through such trusteeship, democracy
and human rights could be instituted and maintained in order more
nearly to effectuate inter-American peace. Something of a sophistry
is present in such reasoning, however, in that threat of measures
which can legally be taken are held over the head of the delinquent
to compel acceptance of a measure which could not otherwise be
legally taken.
Real difficulty is encountered with legality if the derelict state
has neither consented to the trusteeship nor committed a threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression against another
state. Assume a despotic state flagrantly violates the human rights
of its inhabitants to such an extent that a large exodus of these
inhabitants has occurred. The despotic state has engaged in no illegal
acts or acts threatening or breaching the peace in relation to other
states. Other states, however, are aiding and abetting the emigres
within their borders to overturn the tyrannical regime. Although
this regime has contributed to the whole tense situation by creating
conditions within its frontiers that cause the emigration, the im-
mediate threats to peace or acts of aggression emanate from those
states which are supporting the emigres and rebels to overthrow
the dictator. Action under the Rio Treaty should be taken against
those states, not against the dictator. It must be remembered that the
Rio Treaty does not permit collective action in the case of acts en-
dangering the peace alone. Article 6 calls for measures in the case
of aggression, not of armed attack nature, or extra or intra-continen-
tal conflicts, or other situations endangering the peace which at the
same time affect the "inviolability or the integrity of the territory or
the sovereignty or the political independence of an American
State." It is difficult to conceive how an authoritarian regime,
albeit denying all human rights to its inhabitants, is affecting the
territorial integrity, sovereignty, or political independence of another
state, even though its violation of human rights creates international
tensions through the emigration of those inhabitants.
In addition to suspending diplomatic relations or attempting to
impose trusteeships, collective protection of democracy and human
rights also might be pursued by the exclusion of an offender state
from the inter-American system. Bolivar would have excluded from
19721
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his American league any state which changed its form of govern-
ment, i.e., from republicanism to some other form.35 Brazil at the
1948 Bogoti Conference would have made membership under the
Charter of the OAS conditional upon a state having a democratic
form of government. The prerequisites of democracy were listed as
plurality of political parties, freedom of the ballot, the opportunity
of private enterprise, and the guarantee of the fundamental rights of
man. Brazil's recommendation failed to be adopted, but the idea of
isolating nondemocratic states from the OAS did not die. At the
Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers of 1960, President Betancourt
of Venezuela called for a treaty which would exclude from the
organization those states with governments not freely elected by the
people. Additionally, a duty to respect the fundamental rights of
man, guarantee freedom of the press and information, and recognize
the rights of minorities to organize political parties were also re-
quirements, according to President Betancourt 36
1. Cuban Exclusion
To some extent, President Betancourt's recommendations were
to be followed at the 1962 Eighth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs. Despite the fact that the Charter of the OAS contains no
mechanism to depose a non-conforming member, the eighth meeting
-- called to consider problems created by the intervention of inter-
national communism in the hemisphere through Cuba"--ended up
with a resolution which had the effect of expelling Cuba from the
organization.3 The ministers first approved, with only Cuba dis-
senting, a resolution which recognized that continental unity, democ-
racy, human rights, and self-determination were jeopardized by the
subversive offensive of communist governments, the purpose of
which was to destroy democratic institutions and to establish totali-
tarian dictatorship in the Americas at the service of extracontinental
powers. The principles of communism were declared to be incom-
patible with the principles of the inter-American system.39 The
principles were respect and preservation of the rights and freedoms
of man, representative democracy, non-intervention, and a rejection
85 See note 3, supra.
36 See NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES, supra note 17,
at 15.
87 N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1960, at 10, col. 3.
38 On the Punta del Este Meeting, see P.A.U. FINAL ACT EIGHTH MEETING OF
CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SERVING AS ORGAN OF CONSULTA-
TION IN APPLICATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE,
Punta del Este, Uruguay, January 23-31, 1962 (OEA/Ser.C/II.8, 1962) ; THOMAS AND
THOMAS, supra note 5, at 59-60, 238-39, 326-27.
39 Resolution, "Communist Offensive in America," 2 P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN
TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE APPLICATIONS 69 (1964).
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of alliances and agreements that may lead to American intervention
by extra-continental nations.4 A second resolution declared that by
associating itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninism, by estab-
lishing a political, economic and social system based on such a
doctrine and by accepting military assistance from extra-continental
communist powers, including the threat of military intervention in
America by the Soviet Union, the Government of Cuba had acted
contrary to inter-American principles and had thus violated its OAS
membership obligations so as to be incompatible with the OAS. It
was further noted that no member of the OAS can claim the rights
pertaining to its membership if it fails to recognize the correspond-
ing obligations. It was therefore resolved that adherence by any
member state to Marxist-Leninism is incompatible with the inter-
American system. Since the government of Cuba had identified itself
officially as a Marxist-Leninist government, it was incompatible with
the principles and objectives of the OAS. This incompatibility there-
fore excluded the Castro regime from participation in the system.4'
Following this resolution, it might be thought that an inter-
American norm requiring adherence to democracy and respect for
human rights is in being, enforceable by the OAS through the sanc-
tion of exclusion. This would be a doubtful conclusion. Stress was
laid upon the actions of Cuba violative of inter-American principles
which led to Cuba's incompatibility with those principles which in
turn led to Cuba's automatic exclusion. In other words, Cuba by her
own actions creating incompatibility had excluded herself. If Cuba's
actions had led to self-exclusion, exclusion can hardly be considered
as a collective measure by the organization to enforce respect for
human rights or anything else. The exclusion order was. simply a
recognition of fait accompli. Actually, though, we have before us a
speciousness. It is rather clear that the hope was that the resolution
of exclusion of the government of Cuba would so isolate Cuba as to
work hardship and disadvantage upon her so that she would be com-
pelled to return to the fold, to return to legality, and to avoid new
offenses.
Also opposed to any notion that democracy and human rights
have suddenly become enforceable norms of the OAS through the
exclusion of Cuba is the fact that the resolution of exclusion passed
by only the bare two-thirds majority necessary for adoption. Cuba
of course voted in the negative. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, and Mexico abstained." The abstainers were motivated in
40 Id. at 75.
41 Resolution VI, "Exclusion of the Present Government of Cuba from Participa-
tion in the Inter-American System," 2 P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL
ASSISTANCE APPLICATIONS 75 (1964).
42 See THOMAS AND THOMAS, supra note 5, at 60.
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part by the fact that they believed the exclusion to be illegal under
the Charter of the OAS, since no provision was made for this pro-
cedure in that document. 8 Since the order was illegal, it would result
in an illegal intervention in Cuba's internal affairs. These countries
did recognize the incompatibility of a Marxist-Leninist government
with basic American principles, but by failure to agree to any en-
forcement measures against a state departing from these basic prin-
ciples, which include respect for human rights, respect for human
rights seems to be relegated by the abstainers to an "ought" rather
than regarded as an "is."
Finally, the exclusion action was taken against a communist
government committed to the spread of its ideology through sub-
versive intervention-a gross disregard of the American principle
of non-intervention, particularly as it relates to a prohibition of
extra-continental intervention-a mainstay of hemispheric thought
since the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine. Thus, it would seem
that the exclusion is directed toward a Marxist-Leninist government
in violation of respect for human rights, democracy, and other inter-
American principles such as that of non-intervention. Can this be
considered as precedent for an enforceable norm which would be
directed against a state in derogation of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms only? If exclusion is used to enforce representative
democracy and respect for human rights in the Americas, there are
other nations, in addition to Cuba, where neither is observed, and
against which measures could and should be taken. Membership in
the OAS would be considerably reduced-possibly to the breaking
point-if all such trangressors were to be excluded.
2. Intervention in the Dominican Republic and the Inter-American
Peace Force
Discussion has centered to this point upon the authority of the
OAS to safeguard human rights in the American states, and thus
international peace, through the collective security machinery of the
Rio Treaty. OAS action during the 1965 crisis in the Dominican
Republic illustrates that there may be other ways and means to
maintain respect for human rights as a basic principle of the Amer-
ican community.44 At that time, the Tenth Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs established an Inter-American Peace
43 See 2 P.A.U., supra note 39, at 79-80 for statements of these states as to their
votes.
44 For discussion of the crisis see A.J. THOMAS, JR., AND A.V.W. THOMAS, THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965 BACKGROUND PAPER AND PROCEEDINGS Or THE NNTH
HAwMARSKJOLD FORUM (J. Carey ed. 1967). For account of the Tenth Meeting of
the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs see 1 O.A.S. CHRONICLE, Aug., 1965, at
1-10, 19-41.
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Force composed of member-state armed forces for service in the
Dominican Republic.45 This force was not organized for use against
an aggressor or to prevent threats and breaches of inter-American
peace. The Tenth Meeting was not convoked under the Rio Treaty
at all, but under Article 39 of the Charter of the OAS,46 which au-
thorizes Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
not only to serve as the Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty,
but also "to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common
interest to the American States." The Tenth Meeting was to
consider the "[s]erious situation created by armed strife in the
Dominican Republic."4 This nebulous statement made no mention
of armed attack against an American state, aggression which is not
an armed attack, or threats to or breaches of extra-continental or
intra-continental peace, one of which would be requisite for an
application of the Rio Treaty. To the contrary, the Tenth Meeting
was concerned with armed civil strife in the Dominican Republic. 8
Several Meetings of Consultaton have been called under the
urgent-nature-common-interest enabling clause, and from these meet-
ings have come general resolutions and recommendations urging,
requesting, or recommending certain courses of action on the part
of the member states.49 But unlike decisions for measures of collec-
tive enforcement under the Rio Treaty which, except for decisions
made by the consultative organ to use armed force, are binding upon
all member states, the resolutions and recommendations taken by the
Meeting of Foreign Ministers to consider urgent and common
interest problems are not usually thought of as creating obligations. °
Moreover, the power of direct action under the Rio Treaty to
prescribe a certain course of behavior by providing collective mea-
sures for the maintenance of hemisphere peace is exempt by the
OAS Charter from the non-intervention principle of the Americas
as well as the prohibitions against the use of force or military occupa-
tion." A Meeting of Consultation grounded upon the urgent-prob-
lem-common-interest faculty has broad powers to discuss, deliberate,
resolve, and recommend, but its competency here is not exempted
from the basic OAS interdiction on intervention and use of force. If
the OAS as a jural personality is obligated to respect these principles,
45 Resolution, "Inter-American Force," 1 O.A.S. CHRONICLE, Aug., 1965, at 23-24.
46 "Convocation of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs," id. at 19.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See discussion of the various Meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
the powers of the meetings in THowAs AND THOMAS, supra note 5, at 79-85 and ch.
XVII.
50 Id. at 86.
51 O.A.S. CHARTER arts. 15, 16, 17, 19.
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it would be reasonable to assume, that in the absence of specific ex-
ception, any attempt by a Meeting called under the urgent-nature-
common-interest power to impose the collective will of the OAS and
its members against a state without that state's consent would be
illegal intervention. 2
Yet, in the Dominican Republic case, the Tenth Meeting, acting
under the urgent-common-interest power, authorized a use of armed
force through the Inter-American Peace Force to restorce democracy
in the Dominican Republic and, to a lesser extent, protect human
rights. This controversial "American Force resolution"" requested
the governments of member states to make available to the OAS
contingents of their armed forces to operate under the authority of
the Tenth Meeting. Following this resolution, some United States
military forces which had previously landed in the Dominican Re-
public upon the outbreak of civil strife were withdrawn, and the
remainder were incorporated into the Peace Force under a unified
command. Six Latin American nations supplied forces. With the
exception of Brazil, their numbers were small. 4
The Peace Force resolution gave no hint that it was an instru-
ment of inter-American collective security for hemispheric peace or
a measure of enforcement of such inter-American peace. It was
declared that since the OAS was charged with the responsibility of
interpreting the democratic will of its members, and with safeguard-
ing the principles of its charter, it was also empowered to adopt
appropriate measures in the instance presented by the Dominican
Republic to assure the reestablishment of peace and normal demo-
cratic conditions. Since the OAS was competent to assist member
states in the preservation of peace and the reestablishment of normal
democratic conditions, it was also "competent to provide the means
that reality and circumstances require and that prudence compels
as adequate for the accomplishment of such purposes." It was there-
fore legitimate to form the Peace Force for service in the Dominican
Republic which would have:
as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of coop-
erating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Re-
public, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability
of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace
and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institu-
tions.5 4a
52 For discussion see THOMAS AND THOMAS, supra note 5, at 165.
63 See note 45, supra.
54 The peace force was composed of 1,115 men from Brazil, 21 from Costa Rica,
3 from El Salvador, 10,900 from the United States, 250 from Honduras, 164 from
Nicaragua, and 183 from Paraguay. O.A.S. CHRONICLE, supra note 44, at 5.
54a See note 45, supra at 24.
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The venture aimed specifically to permit the functioning of
democratic institutions and to maintain the inviolability of human
rights of the Dominican people.
As discussed previously, inter-American instruments do not
specifically empower the OAS to use coercive measures to enforce
democracy or respect for human rights or the maintenance of such
rights in a state where they have disappeared. Since no such preroga-
tive is granted by existing treaties, an exception to the non-interven-
tion principle can hardly be spelled out if the action of the Tenth
Meeting is considered as intervention. A use of force which con-
trolled and affected the outcome of a civil strife in an American state
would appear to be coercive in nature, altering the condition of
things in the Dominican Republic, and thus violative of Article 15
of the OAS Charter which prohibits intervention.' 5
However, argument has been advanced that this forceful mea-
sure for democracy and human rights in the Dominican Republic
falls outside the meaning of intervention. Some authorities distinguish
collective intervention from collective action.56 Any action taken by
an international organization which is in the general interest of its
members is technically not intervention. Providing the organization
is acting within its constitutional competency, the action may be
acceptable. The Secretary General of the OAS took this point of
view. He stated:
The purpose of the Inter-American Force is dearly not one of inter-
vention but rather one of rendering assistance to the people of a sister
state.51
- A similar contention was advanced before the Security Council
of the United Nations where the Peace Force was designated by the
Malaysian representative as neither intervention nor enforcement
action but a conciliatory function, a type of action permitted to all
international organizations to foster peace and tranquility and to
permit a "people to establish a democratic civil government of their
own choosing, to heal the wounds and the bitterness of civil strife,
and to begin the path of relief and reconstruction."' ,"
The debates before the Security Council were similar to those
concerning the legality under the UN Charter of regional agency
use of armed force against a member state within the region. Article
55 See THOMAS AND THOmAs, supra note 5, at 164-68, for discussion of the O.A.S.
and the principle of intervention.
56 E.g., Lleras, Report on the Ninth International Conference of American States,
1 ANNALS OF O.A.S. 25-27 (1949).
57 As quoted by Mr. Yost of the United States before the Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, S/PV. 1220 June 3, 1965, at 57 (1965).
58 U.N. SCOR, S/PV. 1222 June 9, 1965, at 67-68 (1965).
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51 of the UN Charter permits member states to take measures
including the use of armed force in the exercise of the right of in-
dividual or collective self-defense until such times as the Security
Council takes the necessary steps to maintain peace. But in the
Dominican Republic case, the OAS did not base its action on a
collective right of self-defense. When states within a regional agency
are not exercising a legitimate right of collective self-defense, the
validity of regional measures taken without Security Council ap-
proval is doubtful. Article 53 of the UN Charter demands that
enforcement action not be taken under regional arrangements with-
out authorization by the Security Council. Thus, the validity of
measures taken without such previous authorization appears to
depend upon whether they fall within the meaning of "enforcement
action."
The OAS has always maintained that non-forceful coercive
measures permitted by the Rio Treaty do not fall within the meaning
of "enforcement action" as the phrase is used in the UN Charter.
The director general of the OAS has stated:
Enforcement action, with the use of physical force, is obviously the
prerogative of the Security Council with a single exception: individual
or collective self-defense. But the other measures ... are not; it may
even be said that it is within the power of any state-without neces-
sarily violating the purposes, principles, or provisions to the Charter-
to break diplomatic, consular, and economic relations or to interrupt its
communications with another state.59
Although issue has been taken with this viewpoint, in cases of hemi-
spheric aggressions where the OAS has decided to take diplomatic or
economic measures against an aggressor, Security Council authoriza-
tion has not been sought nor thought to be required."0
Measures involving physical force, according to the thought of
the director general, would be enforcement action. Thus, use of the
Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic would
appear to be beyond the powers of the OAS, for such force was not
authorized by the Security Council. OAS precedent does exist, how-
ever, for a use of OAS force without authorization. The armed naval
quarantine in the Cuban Missile Crisis case was based on an OAS
recommendation under the Rio Treaty that member states take
measures, including the use of armed force, to prevent Cuba from
continuing to receive military material which threatened continental
9 INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF CONTINENTAL PEACE
AND SECURITY, supra note 15, at 41-42.
60 For discussion of the various OAS cases in relation to the U.N. see Mac-
Donald, The Developing Relationship between Superior and Subordinate Political
Bodies at the International Level. A Note on the Experience of the United Nations
and the Organization of American States, 2 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 21 (1964).
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peace and security. 1 A spokesman of the United States at the time
denied this use of physical force was enforcement action. It was
called an action for the maintenance of hemispheric peace taken
under the co-jurisdiction of the OAS with the Security Council.62
The International Court of Justice also seems to have restricted
the meaning of enforcement action. In speaking of the United
Nations armed operations in the Congo, the court construed the
word "action" by saying such operations:
did not include a use of armed force against a state which the Se-
curity Council, under Article 39, determined to have committed an
act of aggression or to have breached the peace. The armed forces
which were utilized in the Congo were not authorized to take military
action against any State. The operation did not involve "preventive
or enforcement measures" against any State under Chapter VII and
therefore did not constitute "action" as that term was used in Article
11.63
This reasoning would support the legality of the Inter-American
Peace Force. Its purpose was not to take action against an aggressor
state or against a government which by its policies was threatening
peace. The operations of the Peace Force were not preventive action
or enforcement action against any aggressor state or peace-breaking
or peace-threatening state. It was action taken against a "[a] civil
disorder, political chaos, bloodshed and internecine war."
'4a The
action was called a conciliatory function, "a pacific settlement opera-
tion which may require a minimum use of force.
'4b The OAS was
preparing "the necessary conditions for the will of the people to find
free expression so that it may ultimately prevail.
'
e
4c
If this line of thought is followed, the OAS can act legally to
assure basic principles of democracy and respect for human rights
in an American state undergoing civil strife by proceeding under its
urgent and common interest power--even to the use of armed force
to reestablish democracy and the inviolability of human rights in the
strife torn land.64d Can we take this a step further and say that such
action can be taken to protect and assure respect for human rights in
an American state where rights have disappeared, or do not exist, or
have been extensively violated, when a state is not engaged in civil
strife? If so, the OAS has its work cut out for it.
61 2 P.A.U., supra note 39, at 112.
62 Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFrAnts 550, at 554-56
(1963).
63 Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, [19621 I.C.J. REPORTS, at 170-71.
64a 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 2 at 117, U.N. Doc. A/6002 (1965).
64b U.N. SCOR, S/PV. June 9, 1965 at 66-68 (1956).
64e Id.
64d See ThOMAS AND Thom AS, supra note 44, at 59 for further discussion of legal-
ity of the Peace Force.
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THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
At the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, the highly
debated issue of safeguarding human rights to protect the stability
of the continent finally resulted in the creation of an Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, composed of seven members elected
by the Council of the Organization.65 The commission, an autono-
mous entity within the OAS, was to promote respect for human rights
by preparing studies and recommendations on progressive measures
in favor of human rights and also to serve the OAS as an advisory
body.66 The commission was established by mere OAS resolution.
It has now become treaty-based. In 1967, the Protocol of Buenos
Aires amended the Charter of the OAS and established the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission as the consultative organ of
the OAS on human rights." The prime function of the organ was
declared to be the promotion, observation, and protection of human
rights. Moreover, the 1970 American Convention on Human Rights6
recognizes the commission as one of the organs-the other being the
Inter-American Court of Justice-with competence relating to the
fulfillment of the obligations made under the convention. This con-
vention continues the commission membership of seven. However,
the members are to be elected by the General Assembly of the OAS
from lists of candidates proposed by member states. The commission
is also directed to prepare its own statute and regulations. The statute
must be submitted to the General Assembly for approval. Since this
convention is not yet operative due to a deficiency in ratifications,
the old statute of the commission continues extant.69
65 Resolution VIII as contained in P.A.U., FIFrH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF
MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ACTAS Y DOCUMENTOS (OEA/Ser.F/II.5,. 1961).
See also, P.A.U. LA ORGANIZACION DE LAS ESTADos AMERICANOS 1954-1962, at 12 (OEA/
Ser.D/II.2, 1959).
66 See functions and powers of the commission as contained in the Statute which
was adopted in 1960 by the Council of the OAS and as amended by the Second Special
Inter-American Conference. Comision Inter-americana de Derechos Humanos, Manual
de Normas Vigentes en Materia de Derechos Humanos, p. 30 et. seq., OEA/Serv.
L/V/II.23, doc. 21, 1970; the statute of the commission is also contained in 1 REVUE
DES DROITS DE L'HoMME-HuMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 144 et. seq. (1968). For discus-
sions of the work of the Inter-American Commission on Civil Rights see A. SCHREIBER,
THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1970); THOMAS AND THOMAS,
supra note 44, at 59-74; Cabranes, The Protection of Human Rights by the Organiza-
tion of American States, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 889, at 893-908 (1968) ; Sandifer, Human
Rights in the Inter-American System, 11 HOWARD LAW J. 508, 516-524 (1965); A.V.W.
Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Jr., The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
20 S.W.L.J. 282 (1966). See also Van Boven, The United Nations Commission on
Human Rights and Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 15 NEDER-
LANDS TjDSCRIFT VOOR INTERNATIONAL RECHT 374 (1968).
67 P.A.U. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AS AMENDED BY
THE PROTOCOL OF BUENOS AIRES IN 1967 ch. XVIII, Treaty Series 1-c (OEA/Ser.A/2
Rev. 1968).
68 American Convention on Human Rights, 5 REV. OF INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS
44-62 (Mar. 1970).
69 Authorities cited note 66, supra.
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The first Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights was adopted by the Council of the OAS in 1960.70 Article 9
described its functions and powers as follows:
a) To develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of
America;
b) To make recommendations to the Governments of the member
states in general, if it considers such action advisable, for the
adoption of progressive measures in favor of human rights within
the framework of their domestic legislation and, in accordance
with their constitutional precepts, appropriate measures to further
the faithful observance of those rights;
c) To prepare such studies or reports as it considers advisable in the
performance of its duties;
d) To urge the Governments of the member states to supply it with
information on the measures adopted by them in matters of hu-
man rights;
e) To serve the Organization of American States as an advisory body
in respect to human rights.
Almost at once, controversy arose as to the scope of the com-
mission's functions and the interpretation of the statute. Many of
the members believed a function confined to the making of reports
for the promotion of respect for human rights generally throughout
the Americas was too narrow. In debating the extent of their au-
thority, a majority of the members of the commission decided that
Article 9(b), which declared that the commission was empowered
to "make recommendations to the governments of the member states
in general," should be interpreted as meaning to make general rec-
ommendations to member states.7 Despite the fact that the OAS
Council had refused to grant individuals and groups the right to
submit petitions to the commission, the commission resolved that it
could accept written communications from individuals claiming viola-
tions of human rights because the commission was authorized to
prepare studies and reports which it deemed advisable.
72 Thus, the
commission determined it could recommend the adoption of general
measures for the promotion of human rights within the framework
of the domestic law of each state as well as recommend to individual
states that they take appropriate measures to assure faithful obser-
vance of human rights within their borders. Complaints from indi-
viduals could also be received and accused governments could be
requested to give information to the commission regarding the steps
taken to remedy violations the commission had called to the atten-
tion of the violator.7
70 Id.
71 P.A.U., INTER-A.AEICAN CO mmIsSIO ON HUmAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
WORK ACCOMPLISIED Dm.iNO ITS FIRST SESSION, OCT. 2-28, 1960, at 10 (OEA/Ser.L/
V/II.I, doc. 32, 1961).
72 Id. at 13.
73 Id. at 12.
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1. Commission's Experiences
a. Cuba. The commission's conclusions regarding its power in
this respect have failed to be accepted as correct by certain states,
and collisions between such states and the commission have resulted.
The commission's experiences with Castro's Cuba have been most
unhappy and disheartening. In 1961, the commission, observing thatit had received communications requesting commission action in
Cuba to void irreparable violations of human rights, suggested to thegovernment of that country that it respect the American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man, and requested that the com-
mission be supplied a report on the measures Cuba was taking to
maintain and advance human rights."4 Cuba denied the commission's
power to make such specific recommendations and requests andintimated that such was an illegal intervention in its affairs.75 The
commission replied that it was interpreting the legal precepts of its
statute in their natural sense, implementing the statute's mandate to
promote respect for human rights.71
The commission subsequently prepared and published two
reports, the first in 1962 entitled, "Report on the Situation Regard-
ing Human Rights in the Republic of Cuba ' 77 and the second, in
1963, "Report on the Situation of Political Prisoners and their
Relatives in Cuba. '78 These reports were based on information,
communications, and complaints received by the commission. The
second report contained testimony from men who had participated
in the Bay of Pigs invasion and who had been released and returned
to the United States. The men told ugly tales of human rights viola-
tions in Cuba: Those accused of crimes against the Cuban revolution
were denied a right to hearing and appeal. Death penalties were
meted out to those designated enemies of the regime and counter-
revolutionaries. Arbitrary arrests were reported as well as the tor-
tures and cruelties occurring in Cuban prisons.
Despite Cuba's attitude, the commission persisted in its efforts.
In 1964, the Cuban Government sent its last message to the com-
mission, refusing to provide any information. It denied OAS juris-
diction because of Cuba's exclusion from the organization, which
was, in turn, characterized as illegal. The commission replied declar-
74 P.A.U. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORTS ON THE
SITUATION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND THEIR RELATIVES IN CUBA ch. I (OEA/Ser.
L/V/II.7, doc. 4, 1963).
75 Id. at 4.
78 Id. at 6.
77 P.A.U. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
SITUATION REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.4,
doc. 30, 1962).
78 See note 74, supra.
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ing its continued competence, inasmuch as the present Cuban govern-
ment had been excluded, not Cuba itself. Under the Commission's
reasoning, Cuba as a state was still obligated to inter-America and
its principles concerning human rights. 9
In 1965, the Cuban government refused to respond to a request
of the commission to visit Cuba,"° and in 1966, when the chairman
of the commission sought once again to obtain human rights informa-
tion from Cuba, he was rebuffed.8' Nevertheless, the commission
did continue to issue damning reports on continued human rights
deprivations in that unfortunate land, particularly as relating to
death penalties for political prisoners, lack of fair criminal pro-
cedures and impartial trials, and the cruel treatment of persons in
prisons. 2
b. Haiti. The commission has fared little better in the treat-
ment it has received from other countries. After receiving complaints
in Haiti and Nicaragua, the commission decided to request permis-
sion to hold part of its 1962 sessions in those nations. Haiti refused,
stating the request was a form of interference in Haiti's internal
affairs.8 Nicaragua assented but left the date open pending further
conversations. When dates were suggested in December, 1962, or
January, 1963, the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister reported that a
date during those two months would not be convenient because of
circumstances of a national and international nature. The chairman
of the commission in November, 1962, again sought permission to
hold a part of its January special session in Nicaragua. A cable was
received two months later stating it would be impossible to designate
the current month of January for a commission session in Nicaragua.
The commission concluded that Nicaragua had refused its assent
for a Nicaraguan meeting for the purpose of ascertaining the obser-
79 See P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAH COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
WORK AccomPusnL Duanio ITS NmTH SESSION: OCT. 5-16, 1964, at 13 (OEA/Ser.
L/V/II.10, doc. 21, 1965); P.A.U. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMrAN RIGHTS,
REPORT ON THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS TENTH SESSION 9-10 (OEA/Ser.L/
V/II.11, doc. 19, 1965).
80 P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS TWELFTH SESSION: OCT. 4-15, 1965, at 17-18 (OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.13, doc. 26, 1966).
81 P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON Hum.AN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS THIRTEENTH SESSION: APRIL 18-28, 1966, at 17
(OEA/Ser.L/V/Il.14, doc. 35, 1966).
82 P.A.U., INTER-AmERICAN COMMfISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT REGARDING
Tax SITUATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.17, doc. 4, rev., 1967);
O.A.S., INTER-AMERICAN COMISSION OP AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AmERICAN COm-
MISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SECOND REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF POLITICAL 
PRISONERS
AND THEIR RELATIVES IN CUBA (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 6, rev. 1, 1970).
88 P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
SITUATION REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI 2-3 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.8, doc. 5, 1963).
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vance of human rights there.84 In both the Haitian and Nicaraguan
instances, the commission through press release widely publicized
that these nations were accused of violating human rights.
In 1963, the commission requested and was again refused per-
mission to study the situation regarding human rights in Haiti on
Haitian territory."5 Haiti stated that the commission's visit might be
interpreted as a form of interference in its internal affairs. The com-
mission made it clear that it respected Haiti's sovereignty, but that it
was empowered by Article 11 (c) of its statute to visit the territory
of an American state with prior consent of the government. Unable
to investigate further, and, in accordance with Article 9(c) of its
statute, the commission then prepared and issued a report on the
situation regarding human rights in Haiti. The report contained com-
plaints indicating serious transgressions by the Haitian government
in its abridgement of a whole spectrum of rights.86 Violations of the
right to life, liberty, and personal property, particularly in the arrest
and disappearance of persons and the mass execution of political
prisoners, were reported. Suppression of freedom of investigation,
opinion, expression and dissemination through the closing of news-
papers and the jailing, torture, and expulsion of newsmen, was
reported. The complaints went on and on alleging: denial of a right
to a fair trial, arbitrary arrest and lack of due process of law, the
denial of the right to asylum, restrictions on the right to vote and to
participate in government through the elimination of opposition
parties, the suppression of the right of assembly and association,
denial of the right to residence and movement, and the violation of
a right to education and culture. Information refuting certain of the
complaints was received by the commission from the Haitian govern-
ment, although such information, according to the commission, did
not relate to all of the complaints.
A second report on Haiti's violations of human rights was re-
leased in 1967.87 This document concerned accusations that Haitian
citizens who were returned to Haiti from the Dominican Republic
had been executed or imprisoned arbitrarily. One instance reported
was the case of the Beauvoir-Florez family. According to a com-
84 On the Nicaraguan case see P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN COMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS FIFTH SESSION, SEPT. 24-
OCT. 26, 1962, at 11-16 (OEA/Ser.L/V/H.5, doc. 40, 1963); P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS
FIRST SPECIAL SESSIONS, JAN. 3-23, 1963, at 11 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.6, doc. 18, 1963).
85 P.A.U. supra note 83, at 4-6.
86 Id. at 9 et. seq.
87 P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REQUESTS FOR
INFORMATION TRANSMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI ON THE CASE OF HAITIAN
CITIZENS RETURNING TO THEIR COUNTRY FROM THE DOMINICAN REPULIC AND THE
CASE OF THE BEAuvom-foz FAMILY (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.16, doc. 2, 1967).
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plaint received, a secret military court sentenced two members of
the family to death after arbitrary arrest. The Haitian government
rejected requests for information regarding returned Haitian citi-
zens, but related that the persons concerned in the Beauvoir-Florez
episode had been sentenced to death for attempted murder and
treason, that the president had pardoned them, and they were free
to depart from Haiti.
Still another report on Haiti was communicated to the Amer-
ican governments by the commission in 1969.88 This document
again listed the rights allegedly violated, the denunciations which
had been received, requests for information, and the replies of the
Haitian government.
c. Nicaragua. In the Nicaraguan situation, the refusal of the
government to receive the commission in 1963 made it impossible
for the commission to monitor Nicaraguan presidential elections in
1963. The commission believed the delays and maneuverings of
Nicaragua were carried on to prevent it from making a determina-
tion as to whether the elections were conducted freely, with ob-
servance of the rights of suffrage. 9
A report was prepared mentioning the denunciations against
Nicaraguan authorities as to human rights, listing the rights which
were held to have been violated, the commission's requests for in-
formation from Nicaragua, and the information that had been sent.
This report was not made public. Complaints in following years
against Nicaragua were found to not constitute sufficient reason to
continue commission study of deprivations of human rights in that
country.9 But in 1966, numerous complaints of flagrant human
rights abuse by Nicaraguan authorities began to pour in. Violations
of rights of free suffrage were also denounced. Several of the cases
had been placed before Nicaraguan judicial authority where no
verdict had been forthcoming. The government offered to transmit
the verdicts when handed down.92 The commission decided to con-
88 P.A.U., INTER-AmERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
SITUATION REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.21, doc. 6 rev.,
1969).
89 P.A.U., INTER-AmECAN COMMsISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS FIRST SPECIAL SESSION: JAN. 3-23, 1963, at 4-8
(OEA/Ser.L/V/II.6, doc. 18, 1963).
90 P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS SIXTH SESSION, APRIL 16-MAY 8, 1963, at 8-12
(OEA/Ser.L/V/II.7, doc. 28, 1963).
91 P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
WORK ACCOMPLISHED DIuNG ITS FOURTEENTH SESSION, OCT. 3-21, 1966, at 12 (OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.15, doc. 29, 1967).
92 P.A.U., INTER-AMEmCAN COMMISSION ON HIMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS FIftEENTH SESSION (SPECIAL) JAN. 9-20, 1967, at
9-10 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.16, doc. 20, 1967).
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tinue to study the Nicaraguan situation. Later, in view of a conflict
between Nicaraguan military personnel and government supporters
on the one hand and the supporters of the opposing presidential
candidate on the other, the chairman of the commission offered to
visit Nicaragua to ascertain what was transpiring. No invitation was
extended although the government did report on the incidentY
d. Guatemala. Complaints of denial of human rights by the
government of Guatemala were received during the 1963-1966 ten-
ure of the Peralta regime. 4 The complaints charged arbitrary arrests
and executions, banning of political parties, suppression of free ex-
pression, forcing opponents of the regime into exile, and the terror-
izing of the rural population. Requests for information by the
commission were either ignored or answered in an unsatisfactory
manner. The commission sought permission to make an on-the-spot
examination of the situation. Permission was denied. The commis-
sion thereafter published a report based on the complaints re-
ceived.95
Some greater degree of cooperation came from Latin American
governments in certain other instances. After preparation of a re-
port kept confidential by the commission regarding human rights
in Paraguay, the chairman of the commission and the Executive
Secretary were permitted to visit that nation.9 Paraguay, however,
did not prove so cooperative in its supply of information on certain
complaints received by the commission: it replied in a manner un-
satisfactory to the commission. Conditions which brought allega-
tions of civil rights violations after the acquisition of power by
military authorities in Ecuador97 and Honduras" also resulted in
93 For report of this incident see Schreiber, supra note 66, at 74.
94 P.A.U. INTER-AMERICAN COM ISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SOLICITUDES DE
INFORMACION TRANSMITADAS AL GOBIERNO DE GUATEMALA (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.15, doc.
5, 1966).
95 Id.
96 P.A.U., INTER-AmERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
WORK ACCOMPLIS ED DURING ITS TWELFTH SESSION, OcT. 4-15, at 1965, 15-16 (OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.13, doc. 26, 1966); P.A.U., REPORT ON THE WORK ACComP-SHED DURING
ITS THIRTEENTH SESSION, APsm 18-28, 1966, at 21-211 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.14, doc. 35,
1966).
97 P.A.U., INTER-AmERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS SEVENTH SESSION, OCT. 7-25, 1963, at 16 (OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.8, doc. 35, 1964); P.A.U., INTER-AmEpICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS EIGHTH SESSION, APRIL
6-20, 1964, at 12-14 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.9, doc. 24, 1964); P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS
NINTH SESSION, OcT. 5-16, 1964, at 20 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.10, doc. 21, 1965); P.A.U.,
INTER-AMERICAN COMsmISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE WORK AccOm-
PLISHED DURING ITS TENTH SESSION 8-9 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.11, doc. 19, 1965). P.A.U.,
INTER-AMERICAN CoaIssSIoN ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE WORK ACCOM-
PLISHED DURING ITS ELEVENTH SESSION (SPECIAL), JULY 21-23, 1965, at 14 (OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.12, doc. 10, 1965).
98 Report of the EIGHTH SESSION, supra note 97, at 16.
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complaints to the commission. In these two instances, the commis-
sion was invited to visit each of these countries, although the invita-
tion was not accepted in either case. 9
e. Dominican Republic. The commission was most successful
in its relations with the Dominican Republic. In 1961, the commis-
sion was granted permission by the Dominican government to visit
and to investigate complaints alleging violations of human rights.
The Dominican government granted permission on the understand-
ing that the commission would restrict its investigations to violations
occurring since the departure of the Trujillo family from the island.
The members gathered information on the arrests and disappear-
ances of persons, the restriction on freedom of expression, and on
the problems of conflict between governmental authorities and stu-
dents, and government and labor unions. The commission then
submitted a report to the Dominican government urging it to take
immediate steps to advance human rights. 00
Other visits were made by the commission to the Dominican
Republic,10' but the most important action of the body in that coun-
try came in 1965, when the commission was invited by the opposing
factions engaged in civil strife to enter and to investigate violations
of human rights.0 2 The Secretary General of the OAS also believed
that the commission should conduct the investigation."0 3 Thus, the
commission acted under Article 9(e) of its statute which permitted
it to serve as an OAS advisory body on human rights. The com-
mission demanded and received from both factions assurances that
they would consider themselves obligated to respect and enforce
human rights as contained in the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, and to extend to the commission those
facilities needed for the fulfillment of its mission.104 In carrying
out its duties in the Dominican Republic, the commission requested
the authorities of the two factions to halt alleged violations of hu-
man rights, visited prisons, and was instrumental in bettering the
lot of and in freeing some political prisoners. Installation of boards
99 Id. at 12-14; REPORT or THE NINTH SESSION, supra note 97, at 19.
100 See P.A.U., INTER-AmERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
WORK ACCOMPLISHED Du iNc ITs THna SESsION, OCT. 2-Nov. 4, 1961, at 4-5 (OEA/
Sev.L/V/II.3, doc. No. 32, 1961). P.A.U., INTER-AmERICAN COMISSION ON HUMw-
RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE SITUATION REGARDING HUAN RIGHTS IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.4, doc. No. 32, 1962).
1
o See PAN AMERICAN UNION SYMPOsIum ON REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY:
SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, DECEMBER 17-22, 1962, at 19 (1963); P.A.U.,
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE WORK ACCOM-
PLISHED DURING ITS SIXTH SESSION, APRIL 16-MAY 8, 1963, at 14-18 (OEA/Ser.L/V/
I.7, doc. 28, 1963).
102 P.A.U., The Dominican Situation, 1 O.A.S. CHRONICLE, Aug., 1965, at 6, 7.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 8.
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of investigation and review was urged and reports of executions
and inhumane treatment of prisoners were conveyed to the authori-
ties. The commission also arranged for some persons to depart the
country in safety and conducted others to political asylum in Latin
American embassies. 105
A special committee of criminologists was called in to aid the com-
mission in the investigation of a mass execution. The deed was
confirmed, the criminologists placing the blame on the Government
of National Reconstruction and stating that this revolutionary fac-
tion had sought to eliminate its adversaries through a policy of mass
executions without trial. 10 The commission was also authorized to
remain in the Dominican Republic until the elected government took
office, in order to assure compliance with the rights of suffrage and
the holding of free and democratic elections.107
f. El Salvador-Honduras. A final case of commission activity
worthy of note is that which arose from the 1969 conflict between
El Salvador and Honduras. Previously the commission had con-
cerned itself with situations primarily involving a violation of hu-
man rights of citizens of a state within the territory of that state
by its government. No dispute between states was involved. But,
in 1969, El Salvador accused Honduras of committing "genocide
such as murders, persecution, outrages, personal injuries, damages
to property and massive expulsions of Salvadorian citizens residing
in Honduras, for the mere fact of their nationality . . . ." On the
same day, Honduras denounced acts in violation of human rights
by sectors of the population of El Salvador against Honduran na-
tionals with the tolerance of the authorities of El Salvador. These
acts occurred after a soccer game between the two countries held
105 P.A.U., TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SITUATION REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (PRELIMINARY
REPORT), (19 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.12, doc. rev., 1965). For summary of work done
D. DUNSHEE DE ABRANCHES, A SPECIAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 3 (Washington World Conference on World Peach Through
Law, T 7/6, Sept. 15, 1965). See also P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, JUNE 1-AUG. 31, 1965 (OEA/Ser. L/V/II.13,
doc. 14 rev., 1965); P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT
OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE
DOMINCIAN REPUBLIC, SEPT. 1-JuLY 6, 1966 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.15, doc. 6 rev., 1966);
See also Sandifer, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican
Republic: June 1965 to June 1966 in THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISES, 1965, at
132 et seq.; THOMAS AND THOMAS, supra note 44, at 59 et seq.
106 P.A.U., TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
DOC. No. 231, at 5-18 (OEA/Ser.F. 11.10, 1965); SITUATION REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (PRELIMINARY REPORT), supra note 105, at 18.
107 P.A.U. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON WORK
ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS ELEVENTH SESSION (SPECIAL), JULY 21-23, 1965, at 11
(OEA/Ser.L/V/II.12, doc. 10, 1965).
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in El Salvador. Several Hondurans were alleged to have been in-
jured in the melee and thousands of Hondurans attending the game
suffered acts of violence against them. Both countries requested the
Secretary General of the OAS to verify the fact of these violations
of human rights in the territory of the other. 8 A subcommittee of
the commission was formed to study the complaints on-the-spot.
The governments of both countries were notified that a study of
their denunciations was beginning. °9
On July 25, 1969, a second Honduran cable was received ac-
cusing the Salvadorian army of acting against Honduran civilians
in towns illegally occupied in Honduras before and after a cease
fire ordered by the Provisional Organ of Consultation. The cable
charged that the Salvadorian troops had indiscriminately murdered,
burned homes, and sacked and destroyed private property. Hon-
duras requested an urgent visit by the commission to verify the
violations." 0 The commission gathered information on the alleged
atrocities and notified both governments that a special meeting
would be held to study violations of human rights in the two coun-
tries. El Salvador rejected the Honduran denunciation but declared
that it would send proof of its innocence to the commission as rap-
idly as possible.
Thereafter, a confidential report issued by the commission on
the first set of charges recommended that each government investi-
gate "the responsibility of the authorities for acts of commission or
omission in connection with deeds of violence" against the citizens
of the other, to adopt those measures necessary to make amends for
such violations, and to protect against future violations of human
rights.
The commission continued to study the complaint filed by
Honduras and other denunciations. The Honduran and El Salva-
dorian governments were requested to supply additional information
for the preparation of the commission's report. The governments
were warned that if they did not reply within the 180-day period
allowed by the commission's regulations, the commission would be
obliged to assume the events were true. The commission then ter-
minated the activities of the on-the-spot subcommittee in the two
countries, without prejudice to the continuation of work on the
problem of human rights and to the reception of communications
regarding violations of human rights there.'
108 O.A.S., INTER-AmEpiCAN COmmlssioN ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
WORK ACCOMPLISHED DURING ITS TWENTY-SECOND SESSION (FIRST AND SECOND PARTS)
AUG. 5-7 AND Nov. 7-22, 1969, at 7-8 (OEA/Ser.L/V/I.22, doc. 15 Add. 1, 1970).
109 Id. at 9.
110 Id. at 11.
111 Id. at 34-41.
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2. Commission's Power
Under its 1960 statute, the commission was limited to discus-
sion, study, investigation and recommendations in general. As can
be gleaned from certain of the above cases, some states contended
that an exercise of this power-specifically through receipt of hu-
man rights complaints in an individual state and requests to that
state for information about the violations-amounted to intervention
in its internal affairs. An acceptance of this view would, of course,
have seriously curtailed the commission's power, for it would then
be bound by Article 15 of the Chapter of Bogota which prohibits
intervention. Ordinarily, discussion, investigation, or even recom-
mendation would not amount to intervention." 2 Whether they are
to be considered acts of intervention would depend on whether they
are coercive attempts to maintain or alter existing conditions against
the state's will."' A discussion and investigation might result in
loss of international prestige through mobilization of public opinion
against a state, compelling the state to act in accord with the will
of the commission even though no threat or other action was made.
In such an instance, if the commission entered into a consideration,
discussion, or investigation directed against a specific state with the
purpose of coercing that state to follow the will of the commission,
the acts would seem interventionary. The same may be said for a
recommendation. A recommendation of a general nature suggesting
a course or policy which all the states of the OAS should follow
would clearly be within the statutory authority of the commission.
But a specific censorious recommendation made against a state for
the purpose of forcing that state's will would be an intervention.
Due to the controversy over the commission's interpretation
of its powers and the charges of intervention, the OAS finally agreed
at the Second Special Inter-American Conference in 1965 to modify
the commission's statute to expand its powers and functions for-
mally." 4 The directives of the conference were placed in the 1966
amendment of the commission's statute. Article 9(bis)" 5 provided,
in part, that in accordance with the wishes of the Second Special
Inter-American Conference, the commission should give particular
attention to observances of the human rights referred to in Articles
112 For discussion of intervention and its definition see A.V.W. THOMAS AND A.J.
THOMAS, JR., NoN-INTrRVENTION, THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS ch. IV
(1956). For a discussion of investigation, discussion, and recommendation as interven-
tion see THOMAS AND THOMAS, supra note 5, at 166-68.
113 THOMAS AND THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION, supra note 112, at 71.
114 P.A.U., SECOND SPECIAL INTFR-AmEriCAN CONFERENCE, RIO DE JANEIRO,
BRAZI, Nov. 17-30, 1965, FINAL ACT, RESOLUTION xxu (OCEA/Ser.C/I.13, 1965).
115 Authorities cited note 66, supra.
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I, II, III, IV, XVIII and XXVI of the American Declaration of
the Rights of Man.
Included therein are the rights to life, liberty, and security of
the person; equality before the law without distinction as to race,
sex, language, creed, or other factor; freedom of religion, of speech,
press, and opinion; free access to the courts to ensure respect for
legal rights and equal protection of the laws; no deprivation of
liberty without due process of law; speedy and public trial; no ex
post facto laws; and no cruel and unusual punishment.
Special commission procedures were set up for the denuncia-
tions of violations of these rights, as well as for communications
received threatening reprisals against signers of denunciations ad-
dressed to the commission or against any person mentioned as an
injured party in such denunciation."1 6 Following Article 9(bis),
paragraph d, it was further provided that consideration by the com-
mission of complaints is dependent upon verified exhaustion of the
internal legal procedures and remedies of the member states in-
volved. The denunciation must be submitted to the commission
within six months of the final domestic decision after the signer
of the complaint has come to realize that recourse to the domestic
remedy has been hindered arbitrarily or the final domestic decision
unjustly delayed1 7 If the violation is confirmed, the commission
prepares a report and makes its recommendation to the government
concerned. If the government does not adopt the measures recom-
mended within a reasonable time, the commission makes such ob-
servations as it desires in its annual report to the Inter-American
Conference or to the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs. If one or the other of these organs fails to respond to
the commission's recommendations and if the government con-
cerned still has not adopted them, the commission may publish the
report."'
Paragraph b of Article 9 (bis) provides that the commission
is empowered:
[t]o examine communications submitted to it and any other available
information; to address the government of any American state for in-
formation deemed pertinent by the commission; and to make recom-
mendations, when it deems this appropriate, with the objective of
bringing about more effective observance of fundamental human rights.
116 Art. 53 of the Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights as set forth in MANUAL DE NoRwAs VIGENTES EN MATERIA DE DERCEcHos
HuMANos or 1 REVUES DES DROITS DE L'HommE-HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL, supra note
66.
117 Regulations, art. 55, supra note 116.
118 Id. at art. 57.
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Thus, the commission's broad interpretation of its powers to
take cognizance of the specific denunciations of human rights be-
comes de jure. Moreover, the powers of the commission are en-
larged. Although the commission had examined complaints since
1960 and had sent them to the government concerned with requests
for information, it had refrained from making decisions as to the
validity of the charges made." a With this amendment to its statute,
the commission could take another step, decision on the merits, in
regard to the special category of human rights.
It should be stressed that the commission's only sanctioning
power has been its power of revealing information to the public.
For example, in the Haitian and Cuban cases where the govern-
ments refused to permit investigation and were deficient in supply-
ing information, the commission published reports, hopeful that the
power of publicity would bring about some rectification."' In other
instances, the commission would keep its report confidential if it
thought that by so doing it could obtain cooperation from a govern-
ment. At best, publication or threat thereof has been a weak sanc-
tion. Dictatorial governments have suppressed the reports within
the borders of their own nation and have paid little heed to the
adverse comments of the commission on the laws or practices and
procedures within the nation. Under the revised special procedures,
if its recommendations to a government are not accepted in a rea-
sonable time, the commission makes its observations known to the
Inter-American Conference or the Meeting of Consultation. The re-
port still can be published if no action is taken by those organs and
if the state does not adopt the commission's recommendations.
The new American Convention on Human Rights continues the
commission and its functions. 2 ° The powers of the commission are
specific and detailed as are their limits. Actually, these revised
provisions read like a combination of the previous statute of the
commission and its regulations. The power to study and report,
request governments for information, and recommend corrective
measures are continued.' 2 ' Persons, groups of persons, and legally
recognized non-governmental entities may lodge petitions with the
commission complaining of the violation of the human rights pro-
visions of the convention by a state party. 2 2 Communications by
one state party alleging violations by another state party may be
11sa See SCHREIBER, supra note, 66 at 53.
119 See SCHREIBER, supra note 66, at 67-68; Thomas and Thomas, The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 66, at 306.
120 See note 68, supra.
121 Art. 41 of the Convention, supra note 68.
122 Id. at art. 44.
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received and examined if the two parties have made declarations
of acceptance of the competence of the commission. 2
If the new convention ever becomes operative through sufficient
ratifications, the power of publication becomes somewhat restricted.
The convention provides that if settlement is not reached concerning
the violation of human rights, a report is transmitted by the com-
mission to the concerned state, and the state is not at liberty to
publish it. If, within three months, the matter has not been settled
or submitted by the state or the commission to the proposed Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the commission may publish
the report. 24
THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The Fifth Meeting of Consultation of American Ministers of
Foreign Affairs not only established the seven man Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, but also directed the Inter-American
Council of Jurists to prepare a draft convention on human rights.
The Council of Jurists was also to prepare one or more conventions
on the creation of an inter-American court and other appropriate
organs for the protection and observance of such rights.2 5 Within
a short time, the Council of Jurists had prepared a draft convention,
based in part on the Inter-American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man, which encompassed economic, social, and cultural
rights, as well as political and civil rights.2 6 The quick action of
the Council of Jurists went for naught. The convention languished
for seven years.
When the Second Special Inter-American Conference met in
Rio de Janeiro in 1965, the draft was dusted off and placed on the
agenda.12 7 After some debate, the Council of the OAS was instructed
to prepare a final version of the draft convention, taking into con-
sideration alternative drafts which had been introduced by the
Chilean and Uruguayan governments. The Council also was autho-
rized to solicit and receive the views of the Inter-American Com-
mission of Human Rights. The second special conference ordered
the revision to be ready by November, 1966, to be submitted to
members of the OAS prior to February, 1967, in preparation for
12 Id. at art. 45.
124 Id. at arts. 50-51.
125 P.A.U. FirFm MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS or FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
ACTAS Y DOCUMENTOS, (OEA/Ser. F/III.5 pp. 308-9 1961).
126 P.A.U., INTER-APERICAN COUNCIL OF JURISTS, FINAL ACT OF THE FOURTH
MEETING OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COUNCIL OF JURISTS (CIJ-43, at 48-75, 1959).
127 P.A.U., SECOND SPECIAL INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE, Rio dE JANIERO,
BRAZIL, Nov. 17-30, 1965, FINAL AcT., RES. xxwv (OEA/Ser.C/I.13 (English), 1965).
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an inter-American specialized conference on human rights tenta-
tively set for March of 1967.128 The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, in April, 1966, began a thorough study of the
three drafts and within a few months, transmitted to the Council
of the OAS its suggestions and recommendations.' 29
Despite the time table established, other events intervened to
prevent fulfillment of the instructions of the second special confer-
ence. In 1967, an extensive reorganization of the inter-American
system was authorized by the Protocol of Buenos Aires.' After
this reorganization, the OAS Council finally began its consideration
of the draft convention.
The Council, noting that the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1966 had adopted the International Convenants on Hu-
man Rights, which had been signed by a number of members of the
OAS, and noting further that substantive provisions in the inter-
American draft were similar to those contained in the UN cove-
nants, decided to consult the members of the OAS before proceeding
further. 1 In the desire to avoid conflicts between universal and
regional rules and institutions, two questions were submitted to
member states. The first queried whether the governments of the
American states desired a single universal system of regulation of
human rights or whether they preferred "the coexistence and co-
ordination" of world-wide and regional conventions covering the
same rights. If the latter point of view were to prevail, a second
question was asked, should the inter-American treaty be limited
to the establishment of an inter-American institutional and proce-
dural system which would include the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights and eventually an inter-American court of jus-
tice? 13
2
Argentina and Brazil advocated that the OAS stop work alto-
gether on the regional convention, but most of the other responding
nations were inclined to feel that there did exist a possibility for
"the coexistence and coordination" of universal and regional con-
ventions. Of these, only a few took the position that a regional
128 Id.
129 P.A.U., INTER-AMERICAN COImmISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, OPINION ON THE
DRAFT CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS APPROVED BY THE INTER-AMERICAN COUNCI, OF
JURISTS (OEA/Serv.L/V/II.16, doc. 8 (English) rev.) (April 24, 1967).
100.A.S., COMMITTEE ON JURIDICAL-POLITICAL AFFAIRS, REPORT ON A CONSULTA-
TION WITH THE MEMBER STATES REGARDING THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS(Council Series, OEA/Ser. G/IV. c-i-787, at 2 (English) rev. 3, June 7, 1967). See
also, Gros Espiell, Le Processus de la R jorme de la Charte de l'Organisation des
Ptats Am~ricains, 14 ANNuAIE FRANqAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 139 (1968).
131 O.A.S., at 3, supra note 130.
132 Id. at 4.
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convention should be limited to providing regional machinery for
implementing substantive norms adopted in the United Nations
Covenants. 8' The Council of the OAS instructed the Inter-Ameri-
can Council of Jurists to prepare a final version of the draft conven-
tion in 1968 to be submitted to the American governments for their
observations, 34 and eventually for final approval at a specialized
conference of the OAS to be called for that purpose in San Jos6,
Costa Rica, in November, 1969.'
At the conclusion of this Inter-American Conference on Human
Rights, twelve members signed the American Convention on Human
Rights, to be known as the Pact of San Jos6." 6 As soon as eleven
states have ratified (and to date only Costa Rica has deposited its
ratification), it will become effective. Consequently, this treaty
marks the culmination of a process of drafting that has been under
way for more than a decade, and it has been hailed as a consumma-
tive endorsement of inter-American concern for the rights of the
individual. Although it was predicted that the new convention would
have significant influence on future inter-American efforts to protect
human rights, 137 some look upon such predictions with skepticism,
pointing out that many of the basic values demanded by the con-
vention are formulated on high levels of abstraction or are not
legally precise. Furthermore, some of the standards are not accept-
able to all members of the OAS.' Portions of the American treaty
parallel the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
while other provisions vary distinctly.
1. The Rights Analyzed
a. Equality. The OAS convention begins with a formal asser-
tion that the ratifying states guarantee to ensure to all persons sub-
ject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of the rights
established by the convention without discrimination for reasons of
133 Id.
134 O.A.S., OBSERVATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTS REGARDING TiE DRAFT CONVEN-
TION ON HuMAN RiGrTS (Council Series, OEA/Ser. G/V, C-d-1519 (English) Add. 2
(Sept. 13, 1967), Add. 3 (Sept. 15, 1967), Add. 6 (Oct. 3, 1967), Add. 7 (Oct. 19,
1967), Add. 8 (Nov. 17, 1967).
135 O.A.S., INTER-AmERICAN SPECIALIZED CONFERENCE ON HumN_ RIGHTS, SAN
JosA, COSTA RICA, Nov. 7-22, 1969, FINAL ACT (OEA/Ser. C/VI.18.1 (English) doc.
70, rev. 1, corr. 1).
136 The signatory nations are El Salvador, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Para-
guay, Panama, Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica.
137 A.L. DEL Russo, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 247 (1971);
MacBride, The European Court of Human Rights, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1970);
American Convention of Human Rights, 5 REV. OF INT'L COM-'N JURISTS 1 (1970).
138 K. VASAK, LA COMMISSION INTERAMERICAINE DES DROITS DE L'HoMME 64 ff.
(1968). Bilder, International Promotion of Human Rights: A Current Assessment, 58
Am. J. INT'L L. 728 (1964).
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race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, economic status, birth or other social condi-
tion-in other words, a right of complete and all encompassing
equality.' This is similar to Article 2 of the United Nations Cove-
nant on Political and Civil Rights,'4 ° and both treaties, throughout,
have provisions re-enforcing this right of equality.1
Yet, of all animal species in the world, human beings are prob-
ably the least equal, differing in many ways, such as sex, intelli-
gence, strength, ability, education, and achievement. Even the most
ardent advocate of equality will recognize that there is a need for
some acceptable basis for discrimination. Without reasonable or
compelling classifications, serious injustice may result. These provi-
sions have to be interpreted loosely or relatively, rather than in
absolute terms, if they are to be a force in the development of
international protection for the right of equality.
b. Life. The right to life, that is, the right not to be killed, is
among the civil and political rights listed. The United Nations cove-
nant makes no mention of the time for the attachment of this
right,'42 but the OAS convention clearly stipulates that the right to
life shall be protected by law "from the moment of conception.' 48
As religious dogma, this requirement may be open to attack in na-
tions where there is separation between church and state. Further-
more, it will encounter opposition from nations that have legalized
abortion.
In addition to the time of attachment requirement, the OAS
convention stipulates that no one shall be "arbitrarily" deprived ofhis life.'44 But the word arbitrarily is not defined, and this has led
to speculation as to its exact meaning. 45 In a legal context, "arbi-
trarily" can signify "not in accordance with law"-"illegally"--or
it can mean "unreasonably" or "unjustly." In United States legal ter-
minology, we speak of procedural due process or substantive due
139 O.A.S., AMERICAN CONVEN17ION ON HuAN RIGHTS, art. 1, para. I (OEA/Ser.K/XVI/I.1, English, doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 2, Jan. 7, 1970) (hereinafter cited O.A.S.
CONVENTION).
140 United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21U.N. GAOR Supp. 16 at 49-60, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (hereinafter cited as U.N.
CONVENTION).
141 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 24; U.N. CONVENTION art. 3, 26. The American
convention does not include the United Nations treaty guarantees accorded to ethnic,
religious, and linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice
their own religion and use their own language. U.N. CONVENTION, art. 27.
142 U.N. CONVENTION art. 6.
143 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 4, para. 1.
144 Id. See also U.N. CONVENTION, art. 6, para. 1.
145 Hassan, The International Covenants on Human Rights: An Approach to In-
terpretation, 19 BUFF. L. REv. 35 (1969).
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process-terms which because of their peculiar common law back-
ground are unacceptable in most civil law countries. If arbitrarily
means illegally-lack of procedural due process-then deprivation
of life by an oppressive government in accordance with the proce-
dures of the municipal law, no matter how unjust, would not fall
within the scope of the treaty. On the other hand, if it is claimed
that a life is taken unreasonably-with lack of substantive due
process-an unknown subjective element is brought into the treaty.
It will be up to the interpreter to decide what is unreasonable.
Ratifiers of the treaties must be aware that what is reasonable to
one group of people, may be highly unreasonably to another.
Although the right to life is not construed to forbid capital
punishment, the inter-American convention calls for its abolition
and specifies that it may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes, may not be imposed on persons below 18 or over 70 years
of age, nor carried out on pregnant women, nor be inflicted for
political offenses. Again, the vagueness of the term "political of-
fenses" leads to possibilities of abuse. 46 Deliberate killing of law
enforcement officers for political reasons may be viewed by some
as murder, but by others as a political offense. In view of the de-
bates which have ensued since heart transplants have taken place,
it is surprising to find that neither treaty contains any specific
stipulation as to when the right to life ends: that is, when death
occurs.
c. Humane Treatment. The right to humane treatment estab-
lished by the OAS treaty147 involves the concept that no person
shall be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. But it goes
even further by declaring that punishment shall not be extended
to any person other than 'the criminal. This, of course, may be
contra to the modern movement to impose penalties on parents
for the delicts of their minor children. The treaty requires minors
accused of crimes to be separated from adults and brought before
specialized juvenile tribunals.148 After the case of In re Gault,4 '
where United States juvenile tribunal procedures were roundly
condemned on the basis of legal and sociological studies, one may
well wonder if such a stipulation in an international treaty may not
be more detrimental than beneficial to the juvenile criminal.
d. Slavery. The freedom from slavery article of the OAS con-
146 6 M. WHITMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 799-859 (1968); Evans Reflections upon
the Political Offender in International Practice, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1963) ; Green,
Political Offences, War Crimes and Extradition, 11 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 329 (1962).
147 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 5.
148 Id. art 3, para. 5.
149 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Paulsen, Juvenile Courts and the
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vention'1° goes a step beyond a similar article in the United Nations
covenant'' in that it not only forbids slavery, slave trade, and in-
voluntary servitude, but it also forbids "traffic in women." Some
female liberation movement will surely label this as male chauvin-
ism.
e. Fair Trial. The rights conceived to be incident to a fair
trial are spelled out in the OAS convention in some detail. 52 In
addition to guarantees of an impartial tribunal, detailed notifications
as to the charges against him, the presumption of innocence until
proven guilty, adequate time and means for the preparation of his
defense, and the right not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself, an accused is given certain other rights. He has a right to
be assisted, without charge, by a translator or interpreter if he does
not understand or does not speak the language of the court.' He
has the right to defend himself personally (which may be a dubious
right under the United States attitude that only a fool would be his
own lawyer) or to be assisted by legal counsel, either of his own
choosing or provided by the state."M He is given the right to com-
municate freely and privately with his counsel, and the right to
appeal the judgment to a higher court.'55 He also has the right to
examine witnesses "present in court," a far more restricted right
than the United States constitutional right of being "confronted
with the witnesses against him."' 56
The UN covenant declares that the person accused of crime
shall "not be compelled to testify against himself, or to confess
guilt."'15 7 The OAS changed this language, for the worse rather than
for the better, by awkwardly stating that a person accused of a
crime has "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself or to plead guilty.' '158
Coerced confessions are banned, as is double jeopardy in cases
where a person has been "acquitted by a non-appealable judg-
ment."' 59 Prior conviction apparently is no bar to subjecting the
person to retrial for the same offense. If he has been acquitted in a
Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J. 527 (1968).
150 O.A.S. CoNvENrIo, art. 6.
151 U.N. CONV nON, art. 8.
152 O.A.S. CONVWNTOno, art. 8.
153 Id. art. 8, para. 2 (a).
154 Id. art. 8, para. 2(d), (e).
'55 Id. art. 8, para. 2(h).
156 Id. art. 8, para. 2(f); U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
157 U.N. Co WNToN=N, art. 14, para. 3(g).
158 O.A.S. CO VNTION, art. 8, para. 2 (g).
159 Id. art. 8, para. 4.
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country where the state is given the right of appeal, either on basis
of law or fact, apparently he cannot plead double jeopardy.
The right of public trial is not absolute, but is circumscribed
by the restriction that criminal trials need not be public if "it is
necessary to protect the interests of justice." 1 0 This, of course, gives
a great deal of discretion to the judiciary as to when the public may
be banned from a criminal trial. The UN covenant is even broader,
for there it is stated that:
the press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial
for reasons of morals, public order, or national security in a demo-
cratic society, or when the interests of the private lives of the parties
so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the
interests of justice. 161
It is apparent from these two treaties that the desirability of a pub-
lic trial is not widely revered.
In contrast, equality before the law and equal protection of
the law are emphasized and re-emphasized in both instruments,162
and both give guarantees to establish effective, simple, and prompt
recourse to a competent national court or tribunal against acts that
violate the rights of the complainant." Both guarantee to "develop
the possibilities of judicial remedy 1 64 and to ensure enforcement
of such remedies when granted. Paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the UN
covenant stipulates application in violation of the provisions of
the covenant only, whereas Article 25 of the OAS treaty is more
extensive in that it is applicable to acts that violate fundamental
rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned
as well as those recognized by the convention.
f. Liberty. The UN convention and the OAS convention en-
dorse a right of personal liberty, but there are certain variations in
the range of guarantees set forth by the two treaties. 5 Agreement
is mutual that no one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or impris-
onment; that the accused shall enjoy a right to a speedy trial by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal; that the accused
shall have the right to be informed of the nature and character of
the charges against him; and that he shall have a right to a proce-
dure closely akin to a habeas corpus proceeding. 66
160 Id. art. 8, para. 5.
161 U.N. CoNVENTIoN, art. 14, para. 1.
162 Id. art. 14, par. 1; art. 2, par. 1; OAS CONVENTION, art. 24.
163 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 7; U.N. CONVENTION, art. 9.
164 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 25; U.N. CONVENTION, art. 2, para. 3.
165 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 7, para. 6; U.N. CONVENTION, art. 9, para. 4.
166 O.A.S. CONVENTION art. 7, para. 6; U.N. CONVENTION, art. 9, para. 4.
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In their constitutions, many Latin American countries provide
for preventive detention when a president declares an estado de
sitio.167 This would create a potential conflict between treaty law
and constitutional law if it were not that the OAS treaty itself rec-
ognizes the possibility of suspension of guarantees of the treaty.
Under Article 27 it is stated:
In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the
independence or security of a State Party, it may take measures dero-
gating from its obligations under the present Convention to the extent
and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation.
In spite of all the high sounding pronouncements on personal lib-
erty, this broad exemption permits, without incurring international
responsibility, almost the same power of preventive detention exist-
ing today in the internal laws of some nations. The limitation that
a state availing itself of the right of suspension shall inform all
other parties via the Secretary General of the OAS of the reasons
given for suspension, the articles it has suspended, and the date set
for the termination of such suspension would not seem to create a
great deal of restraint on the right to suspend guarantees. 6
A unique provision in the OAS treaty specifies that states which
permit an individual recourse to the courts if he feels his liberty
about to be threatened may never restrict or abolish this right.'69
There is no similar provision in the UN covenant.
The OAS convention also abolishes imprisonment for debt, ex-
cept those debts consisting of nonfulfillment of judicial orders of
child or wife support.170 This apparently was an answer to the UN
convention statement that no person was to be imprisoned because
167 Two typical examples can be found in the Constitutions of Honduras and
Nicaragua. Art. 107 (ch. 7) of the 1965 Constitution of Honduras declares:
The guarantees established (in the preceding articles) may be suspended in
the event of invation of the national territory, serious disturbance of the
peace, an epidemic, or other disaster, by the President of the Republic, by
means of a decree....
Articles 196 and 197 of the Constitution of Nicaragua (1962) declare:
The President of the Republic, whenever in his opinion the public tranquility
is threatened, may order the detention of persons presumed responsible. ...
The President of the Republic, in the Council of Ministers, may suspend or
restrict, in all or a part of the national territory, the exercise of constitutional
guarantees in any of the following cases: when the Republic becomes involved
in an international or civil war; when there is danger that either of these may
occur; in the case of epidemic, earthquake or other public disaster; whenever
due to any other circumstances it is required for the protection, peace, or
security of the nation or of its institutions or form of government.
168 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 27, para. 3.
169 Id. art. 7, para. 6.
170 Id. art. 7, para. 7.
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of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation.' While the UN
covenant provides that a victim of unlawful arrest or detention
shall have an enforceable right to compensation," 2 the OAS docu-
ment waters this down by stipulating that the victim of a miscar-
riage of justice has a right to be compensated therefor "in accor-
dance with the law."' 73 If no internal law makes provision for such
compensation, apparently the victim is without remedy.
A double guarantee is established by the OAS convention
against ex post facto laws. Article 7 Paragraph 2, states:
No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons
and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of
the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.
This is further elaborated in Article 9:
No one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute
a criminal offense, under the applicable law, at the time it was com-
mitted. A heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was
applicable at the time the criminal offense was committed. If subse-
quent to the commission of the offense, the law provides for imposition
of a lighter punishment, the guilty person shall benefit therefrom.
Would this run contrary to recent Supreme Court of the United
States decisions where the non-retroactivity doctrine has been ac-
cepted with reference to cases which redefine the rights of those
accused of crime in the light of modern constitutional theories? 74
g. Privacy. When it comes to the right of privacy, the OAS
treaty sets forth a right which is dear to the heart of all Latin Amer-
icans, but which can best be called an ethical aspiration whose
importance is less of achievement than intent: "Everyone has the
right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized." 73 Is
this command addressed to governments or to private individuals?
What of persons who have no honor or no dignity? Does the treaty's
subsequent statement that no one may be the object of an unlawful
attack on his honor or reputation modify the preceding statement?
Can you really equate an unlawful attack on honor and reputation
with recognition of dignity and respect for honor?
"No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference
with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence
171 U.N. CONVENTION, art. 11.
172 Id. art. 9, para. 5.
173 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 10.
174 Desist v. U.S., 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
(1966).
175 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 11, para. 1.
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S... everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference."' 76 Again, one can question the meaning of the
word arbitrary and here the confusion is compounded by adding
the word "abusive." Are these words to be interpreted as "unlawful"
or do they have a wider connotation than contrary to law? For ex-
ample, would the publication of a person's name on a list of tax
delinquents (permitted in places by law) be considered an arbi-
trary or abusive interference with his private life? Would a listing
as a bad credit risk in a merchant's retail credit association be
considered an arbitrary or abusive interference with his private
life?
h. Religion. The right to freedom of religion is conceded in
both the UN declaration"' and the OAS treaty,178 but both then
go on to admit this freedom may be subject to severe limitations
by law necessary to protect public safety, order, health, morals, or
the rights or freedoms of others . 79 The OAS broadly grants free-
dom to disseminate one's religion or beliefs, either individually or
together with others in public or private.8 0 There is no limitation
on this broad grant, yet this surely must be illusory because even
nations most protective of religious freedom resort to the police
power of the state to regulate the dissemination of religious beliefs.
One cannot, for example, disseminate one's religion in the middle
of Times Square during the evening rush hour.
The apparently reasonable statement that parents have the right
to provide for the religious and moral education of their children in
accord with their own convictions,' may be a strong deterrent to
the ratification of the treaty by some nations. The Government of
Mexico, for example, has required all parochial schools to utilize
the same text books used in Mexican public schools, in the face of
parental claims that these books present religious and moral views
unacceptable to them.
i. Freedom of Speech. Freedom of speech and press provisions
of the OAS treaty go an astonishing step beyond those of the United
Nations or of the European Convention on Human Rights. The
OAS document states these freedoms shall not be subject to prior
censorship but shall be subject "to subsequent imposition of liability
to ensure the protection of national security, public order, public
176 Id. art. 11, para. 2.
177 U.N. CONVENTION, art. 18.
178 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 12.
179 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 12, para. 3; U.N. CONVENTION, art. 18, para. 3.
180 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 12, para. 1.
181 Id. art. 12, para. 4.
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health and morals, and to ensure respect for the rights or reputation
of others."' 8 2 In other words, the ban on prior censorship is absolute.
The UN convention stipulates that freedom of the press may
be restricted by law for the same reasons,"s but does not limit this
restriction to subsequent liability. In other words, prior censorship
is legitimate under the UN document in some cases. The European
convention, also permits prior censorship for even a wider area of
information:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restric-
tions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial in-
tegrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information re-
ceived in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary.' 84
Unquestionably, this article places limits on free speech and the
press, limits which have been accepted by many nations. The OAS
treaty permits no prior measures of restriction on freedom of the
press or speech to protect the rights or reputation of others (which
would include libel or slander), or in order to preserve the security,
public order, or the public health or morals of the nation. In the
United States, obscene speech-when so determined by the Su-
preme Court-is not given protection, thus it could be subjected
to subsequent liability and also to previous restraint. 5 Although
the older United States constitutional view would permit libel to be
subject to previous restraint, the new view declares that such
speech cannot be subject even to subsequent liability unless the
words were uttered or written with actual malice. Malice imports
knowledge that the words were false or that they were uttered with
reckless disregard of whether false or not. 18 6
Under the OAS Convention, censorship by restraint is permis-
sible for the regulation of public entertainment which has been
182 Id. art. 13, para. 2.
183 U.N. CONVENTION, art. 19, para. 3.
184 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 1, para. 2.
185 Freedom v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957). See also K. KUH, FOOLISH FIGLEAVES: PORNOGRAPHY IN AND OUT OF COURT
(1967); R. Cancel Negron, En Torno a la Obscenidad: Un Concepto Juridico Im-
preciso, 29 REVISTA DEL COLEGIO ABOGADOS DE PUERTO Rico 169 (1969); W.F. Eich,
From Ulysses to Portnoy: A Pornographic Primer, 53 MARQUETTE L. REV. 155 (1970).
186 See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
1972 ]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
determined to be morally detrimental to children or adolescents. 87
The words "public entertainment" are not defined in the treaty.
Apparently, they were not designed to extend to reading material,
for such would fall within a classification of private entertainment.
Both the OAS Convention18 and the UN Convention189 permit
restrictions on war propaganda and on advocacy of national, racial,
or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence.
The UN document would permit subsequent or previous restraint
by law, while under the OAS treaty, they are offenses punishable
(subsequent liability) by law. This type of restriction would prob-
ably run afoul of the United States Constitution which permits
citizens to express their views freely and fully on any subject no
matter how obnoxious the views may be. A government may act
only where speech is associated with and threatens imminently to
lead to action against which the public has a right to be protected. 9°
Query, would inciting Indians in certain South American na-
tions to forceful illegal action against white rulers be prohibited by
this portion of the treaty? Would propaganda for war among the
African nations to force South Africa to change its apartheid poli-
cies fall within this type of ban?
Neither the OAS treaty nor the UN convention make provi-
sion for professional secrecy which is protected by the European
convention. 9' Apparently, in Europe it is believed that the press
should have adequate sources of information, and that a journalist
may not be called upon, even in the public interest, to disclose the
source of information which he has received in confidence. In many
jurisdictions of the United States refusal to reveal sources to the
court can amount to contempt, if there is a proven compelling in-
terest for such information.
The American treaty includes provisions guaranteeing to a per-
son defamed in the press or other media the right to have a correc-
tion or reply published in the same medium. 92 This right is not
included in the UN instrument, probably because the UN conven-
tion on the International Right of Correction 98 covers this.
j. Assembly. The right of peaceful assembly is recognized by
187 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 13, para. 4.
188 Id. art. 13, para. 5.
189 U.N. CONVENTION, art. 20.
190 Dennis v. U.S. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). But see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952).
191 See note 184 and accompanying text, supra.
192 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 14.
193 Convention on the International Right of Correction, G.A. Res. 630, - U.N.
GAOR Supp. 20, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1959).
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both documents.94 and both contain the extensive qualifying clause
that this right may be restricted by the police power of the state.
This ban is so broad that any government restraining right of as-
sembly would naturally base it upon the exception. In dictatorial
situations, the right could well be meaningless.
A different emphasis is placed on the right of association guar-
anteed by the United Nations. The UN declares that everyone shall
have the right of freedom of association with others, including the
right to form and join trade unions. The OAS states that everyone
has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political,
economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes. 195 Inas-
much as some Latin American nations ban the communist party,
and Argentina bans all political activities and associations, this
might well be a stumbling block toward the adoption of the Pact
of San Jos6. However, both treaties add the broad limitation that
the police powers may be used to proscribe this right, and it can
always be argued that the right of association has been restricted
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public order.
Both treaties stipulate that imposition of legal restrictions,
including total deprivation of the right of association, may be
placed on members of the armed forces and the police.'96 With
law enforcement officers demanding the right to organize, this addi-
tional restriction may lead to strong internal opposition in some
areas.
k. Family Law. Despite certain sociological claims that the
family is an anachronism, and that the commune is the wave of the
future, it is somewhat reassuring to find that both treaties cate-
gorically state: "The family is the natural and fundamental group
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the
state.' '197
Both treaties recognize the right of men and women of mar-
riageable age to marry and to raise a family, 9 ' but the OAS con-
vention adds the qualification: "If they meet the conditions required
by domestic laws insofar as such conditions do not affect the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination established in this Convention."
Under this wording, could modern homosexuals claim that de-
nial of their right to marry one another is discriminatory, and hence
illegal? Would this be upheld under the OAS treaty?
194 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. I; U.N. CONVENTION, art. 21.
195 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 16; U.N. CONVENTION, art. 22.
196 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 16, para. 3; U.N. CONVENTION, art. 22.
197 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 17; U.N. CONVENTION, art. 23.
198 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 17, para. 2; U.N. CONWNToN, art. 23, para. 2.
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While the UN covenant states that parties to the treaty shall
take "appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsi-
bilities of the spouses, ' 19 the OAS treaty is more cautiously worded:
"to ensure the equality of rights and the adequate balancing of re-
sponsibilities of the spouses .... "20 This reflects the Latin American
attitude that marriage, under most Latin American legal systems, is
based upon the principle of family authority resting with the hus-
band, especially in connection with property rights. Marriage estab-
lishes a community of property between husband and wife, but it is
the duty of the husband to administer this community.
In addition to spousal rights, the OAS treaty goes far beyond
the universal treaty and even beyond the internal law of many
western hemispheric nations when it declares that the law shall
recognize equal rights for children born out of wedlock.2"'
Both treaties stipulate that a child shall have the right to a
name, and to such protection as is required, from his family, society,
and the state.2 2 In setting forth these rights, the treaties are neces-
sarily vague in identifying those who are responsible for assuring
that the child's rights are observed.
Treatment of the right to nationality is more detailed in the
OAS treaty20 than in the UN convention, which states merely that
every child has the "right to acquire a nationality.120 4 The OAS in-
strument separates the rights of the child from the rights of nation-
ality, by declaring that every person has the right to a nationality,
and if he does not have a right to any other nationality, he must be
given the nationality of the state in whose territory he was born.
Further, no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or
of the right to change it.20 5 Again, "arbitrarily" is not defined and
this could lead to questioning. For example, in the Nottebohm
case, 2  many authorities believed the International Court of Justice
"arbitrarily" deprived Nottebohm of his right to change his na-
tionality.20 7
199 U.N. CONVENTION, art. 23, para. 4.
200 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 17, para. 4. (emphasis added)
201 Id. art. 17, para. 5.
202 O.A.S. CONVENTION, arts. 18, 19; U.N. CONVENTION, art. 24.
203 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 20.
204 U.N. CONVENTION, art. 24, para. 3.
205 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 20.
200 Nottebohm Case, [1955] I.C.J. 4.
207 H.F. VAN PANHUYS, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1959); de Visscher, L'Affaire Nottebohm, 60 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC 238 (1956); Glazer, Affaire Nottebohm-A Critique, 44 GEORGETOWN
LAW J. 313 (1955-56); Jones, The Nottebohm Case, 5 INT. AND Comp. LAw QUARTERLY
230 (1956), Loewenfield, Der Fall Nottebohm 5 ARCHIv DES VOLKERRECHTS 387 (1956).
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1. Property. One right completely omitted in the universal con-
vention is the right to property. Some societies recognize no private
property rights, and others view foreign ownership of property
within the nation as the result of an imposed system of exploitation.
Except for Cuba, all nations of the western hemisphere are
operating under a controlled private property system, and conse-
quently, it was thought important to include in the Pact that every-
one has the right to use and enjoy his property.208 This right is not
an absolute one. The treaty not only stipulates that such use and
enjoyment may be subordinated to the interests of society, but that
a person may be deprived of his property for reasons of public
utility or social interest, according to the forms established by law.
Considering the long battle between the United States and Latin
America concerning international accountability in the taking of
property of aliens, it is surprising to see in the treaty that just com-
pensation must be paid for the deprivation of property. But the OAS
treaty does not go as far as the European Convention on Human
Rights which provides that "no one shall be deprived of his pos-
sessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international
law.' 2°' The reference to general principles of international law was
made to emphasize that regardless of the attitude of a government
toward property rights of its own citizens, foreign owners whose
property was taken for a public purpose were entitled to just, ade-
quate, and prompt compensation.
The OAS treaty also prohibites "usury and any other form of
exploitation of man by man . . . .,21 The nature of usury varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and no attempt was made to pin-
point the amount of interest considered to be usury. Nor is there
a clear indication of other forms of exploitation. No government
signing the treaty can be sure of the commitment it is making under
this provision and the nature of implementing measures needed to
fulfill it.
m. Travel. Both treaties establish a right of freedom of move-
ment within a state, the right to leave any country freely, and the
right to re-enter one's own country.211 But these rights are again
curtailed by that extensive exception relating to "prevention of
crime, protection of national security, public safety, public order,
public morals, public health or the rights or freedoms of others."
208 O.A.S. CoNvzm-oN, art. 21.
209 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 1 (Protocol No. 1, March 20, 1952).
210 Q.A.S. CoNVENTIOi, art. 21, para 3.
211 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 22; U.N. CONVENTION art. 12.
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These rights, too, can mean as much or as little as the ratifying state
wishes them to mean.
The drafters of the OAS treaty are short of memory or poor
historians, for it seems impossible to rationalize in a Latin American
context, the stipulation that "no one can be expelled from the terri-
tory of the state of which he is a national.1 212 After two incompre-
hensible decisions by the International Court of Justice in the Haya
de La Torre asylum issue between Peru and Columbia,218 the honor
of both nations was preserved by the ingenious device of "expelling"
Peruvian Haya de La Torre from Peruvian territory rather than
granting him the customary safe conduct out of the country. Con-
stitutional grants of power in certain Latin American constitutions
permit expulsion or removal from the country.214
The treaties stipulate that aliens lawfully in the territory of a
treaty member state may be expelled only pursuant to a decision
reached in accordance with law. The UN treaty adds that except
where compelling interests of national security control, aliens may
have a full review of expulsion decisions by competent authorities.215
The OAS treaty declares that "collective expulsion of aliens is pro-
hibited."2 16 Query: does this apply only to aliens lawfully within
a nation, or does it also apply to aliens unlawfully within a nation?
One of the causes of the so-called "soccer war ' 21 between Honduras
and El Salvador was the collective expulsion of Salvadorans who
had illegally squatted in Honduras. Does the adjective "collective"
refer to all aliens from a certain nation, to all aliens, to a number
of aliens, or to a group of aliens from a certain nation? Is the weekly
round-up of wet-backs in the West and Southwestern part of the
United States a collective expulsion of aliens?
The OAS treaty is additionally careful of the rights of aliens
when it stipulates that an alien may not be deported or returned to
212 O.A.S. CoNvENTIoN, art 22, para. S.
218 Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Cases, [1950] I.C.J. 266; [1951] I.C.J. 71;
A.V.W. ThoMAs, A.J. ToMAs, JR., NoN-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN
THE AMERICAS 393-398 (1956).
214 PERU CONST. art. 68 provides:
No one may be banished from the territory of the Republic, nor removedfrom his place of residence, except by a writ of sentence or by application of
the aliens law.
See also ARGENTINA CONST. art. 23 which provides:
But during such suspension the President of the Republic shall not convict
or apply punishment upon his own authority. His power shall be limited, in
such a case, with respect to persons, to arresting them, or transferring themfrom one point of the Nation to another, if they do not prefer to leave
Argentine Territory.
215 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 22, para. 6; UN CONVENTION, art. 13.
210 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 22, para. 9.
217 Fenwick, Honduras-El Salvador, Procedures under Rio Treaty oj Reciprocal
Assistance, 63 Am. J. INTL L. 769 (1969).
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any country if in that country his right to life or personal freedom
is in danger "because of his race, nationality, religion, social status,
or political opinions."21
Another aspect of freedom of movement mentioned only in
the OAS treaty is that relating to the right of territorial asylum in
foreign nations for "political offenses or related common crimes." '219
During the San Jose conference, El Salvador suggested that "polit-
ical offenses" should be defined in the treaty as:
infractions against the organization or function of the state and against
the political rights of citizens. The concept of political offense shall not
be considered to include a crime that gives rise to a state of terror, an
attempt on the life of a chief of state, or a crime inspired by base mo-
tives. 20
Other nations objected to that particular definition and to the in-
clusion in the treaty of a precise definition of political offenses, since
the Inter-American Juridical Committee had prepared a study of
political offenses in 1959 which had not been acted upon by the
OAS.221 As a compromise, the conference requested the Council of
the OAS to recommend to the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights that it prepare a study on political offenses. The com-
mission was to consider the 1959 study, the draft presented by El
Salvador, and the discussions that ensued at San Jos6. The human
rights commission was to submit its findings to a specialized con-
ference for review and consideration.21 Although this was probably
the easiest way to skirt the issue, the exact nature of a political
offense remains blurred. One might argue that, without adequate
definition, it is possible to assert that war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against the peace must fall within the category of "political
offenses."
n. Political Activity. Except for certain restrictions in the
inter-American treaty, both instruments have basically the same
provision relating to the right to participate in government: every
citizen has a right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, di-
rectly or through freely chosen representatives; to vote and to be
elected in genuine periodical elections which by secret ballot guaran-
tee the free expression of the will of the voters; and to have access,
under general conditions of equality, to public service.2= Since single
218 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 22, para. 8.
219 Id. art. 22, para. 7.
220 O.A.S., INTER-AMERICAN SPECIALIZED CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FINAL
Act 5-7 (OEA/Ser. K/SVI/I.1 (English) doc. 70, rev. 1, corr. 1, Jan. 7, 1970).
221 Id. at 6.
222 Id. at 7.
223 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 23; U.N. CONVENTION, art. 25.
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party totalitarian nations which outlaw political opposition, such
as Russia and Spain, have raised no objection to these stipulations,
it might well be questioned whether the phrases "freely chosen
representatives," "secret ballot," and "free expression of the will
of the voter" are unequivocal legal terms on the international level.
In addition, this section does not measure up to the 1959 Declara-
tion of Santiago 4 which particularly emphasized that perpetuation
in power, or the exercise of power without a fixed term and with the
manifest intention of perpetuation, is incompatible with the exercise
of democracy in the Americas.
The restrictions on participation in government established by
the inter-American treaty are those based on age, nationality, resi-
dence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, and sentencing
by a competent court in criminal proceedings.225 Age and civil or
mental incapacity, standard disqualifications in most nations, prob-
ably would create little furor on the international level. But the
issue of nationality contains possible elements of denial of human
rights. If resident aliens can never obtain nationality, their right to
eventual participation in government is foreclosed. Language and
education could also raise some very fundamental human rights
issues. For example, a good percentage of the Indian population
of Guatemala does not speak Spanish. If the Guatemalan govern-
ment requires knowledge of Spanish for voter qualification, these
Indians are effectively disenfranchised. And the educational quali-
fication is exceptionally broad-obviously more must be meant than
complete illiteracy, or the word "education" would not have been
used. Does it imply that a nation can set definite educational re-
quirements for voting? For example, "no one may vote without eight
years of school attendance." If so, this qualification could disen-
franchise a large segment of the potential voting population of the
hemisphere.
2. Implementation
Since a number of the Western Hemisphere nations have a
federal form of government, as opposed to a unitary form, the OAS
treaty declares that in such states, the national government shall
implement all the provisions of the convention over whose subject
matter it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction. In accordance
with its constitution and laws, the national government shall coop-
erate with its constituent units which in turn "may" adopt appro-
priate provisions for the fulfillment of the convention. 226 No such
224 AN.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE ORGANIZATION OF AmERICAN STATES,
230-31 (1963).
225 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 23, para. 2.
226 Id. art. 28.
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attempts at adjustment between federal-state relations appear in
the UN convention, which flatly states the provisions of the treaty
"shall extend to all parts of federal states without any limitations
or exceptions." '227
Under the guise of restrictions regarding the interpretation of
the treaty, a very broad concept crept into the OAS treaty. There,
it is stated that no provision of the treaty shall be interpreted as
permitting any "State Party, group or persons" to suppress the en-
joyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in the
convention.228 Inasmuch as the treaty deals with the obligations of
governments to persons within their jurisdiction and the rights of
human persons as against the state, this appears to be a vast exten-
sion of the treaty to non-governmental groups and persons. If a
non-governmental group or person not acting under color of law,
denied one of the rights established in the treaty, would the nation
be held responsible? If a newspaper editor refused to print a letter
-no matter how innocuous-is he not denying to the writer freedom
to express ideas in print, and thus violating freedom of expression?
If a church refuses the use of its pulpit to an atheist is it not denying
freedom to profess one's belief in public or in private? If a fraternal
organization is selective in its membership, is it denying the right of
everyone to associate freely for social or other purposes? What of
a wife abusively interfering with her husband's extra-marital private
life; would she be violating the treaty guarantee that no one may
be the object of abusive interference with his private life?
3. Duties
The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
adopted at BogotA in 1948 concerned itself not only with the rights
of individuals, but also with the duties that each individual owed
to the society in which he lived. The long list of duties placed in
that declaration was questioned because the theory of international
protection of human rights is that the individual can be over-
whelmed by the massive collective force of the state.229 Conse-
quently, in the American Convention on Human Rights is a simple
statement that every person has responsibilities to his family, his
community, and mankind.20
In 1966, the UN divided the protection of human rights into
two distinct spheres by adopting the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
227 U.N. CONVENTION, art. 50.
228 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 29.
229 See note 22, supra.
230 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 32.
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In view of this action, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights had suggested in 1966 that the proposed treaty should not
include articles establishing binding legal obligations in the economic,
cultural, and social fields. The commission had serious doubts about
the appropriateness of including those rights in the future inter-
American convention."3 1 Instead, it suggested that the proposed
convention contain a broad provision relating only to the "progres-
sive development" of economic, social, and cultural rights in the
hemisphere. This suggestion was adopted and the American treaty
stipulates that the ratifying nations will undertake to adopt mea-
sures, both internally and through international cooperation with
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural
standards set forth in the Charter of the OAS, as amended by the
Protocol of Buenos Aires. a2
THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
With the growing emphasis on human rights following World
War II, the inter-American system recognized that if such rights
were to be protected adequately there was a need for international
machinery to enforce international guarantees. The Ninth Confer-
ence in 1948 resolved that the Inter-American Council of Jurists
and its permanent committee, the Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee, should give thought to a treaty providing for an "Inter-
American Court to Protect the Rights of Man." After an investiga-
tion, the Juridical Committee reported that it was not feasible to
create such a court because of the lack of substantive law on human
rights and because the establishment of such a court would involve
a radical transformation of the constitutional systems of some of the
American states. This report was accepted and approved by the
Council of Jurists and by the Council of the OAS,233
There the matter rested until the Fifth Meeting of Consultation
in Santiago in 1959. Human rights again surfaced as a vital issue
of inter-American affairs. To assure that the human rights activities
of the OAS would not remain compromised at the lowest level of
controversial principles-mere statements of rights without legal
effect or effective implementation-some measure of enforcement
was needed. The Fifth Meeting established the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, and issued orders to the Inter-American
Council of Jurists to prepare draft conventions on human rights. The
231 O.A.S., INTER-AxERICAN CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF Hum" RIoHTS,
ANNOTATIONS 35 (OEA/Ser.L/V (English) II. 19. doc. 53, Mar. 21, 1969).
232 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 26.
233 THoMAs & THOMAs, supra note 224, at 227, 232-33, 400-401.
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conventions were to include not only the human rights commission
but also another supra-national mechanism to guarantee those rights
-an Inter-American Court of Human Rights." 4
This dual means of protection is continued in the present Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights.
The commission on human rights is not a tribunal; its main
functions are fact finding and seeking compromise. If the commis-
sion is unable to bring about a settlement, the new treaty establishes
judicial machinery for implementation of the treaty, thereby at-
tempting to remove human rights issues one step farther from the
political arena and place them under the judisdiction of an indepen-
dent juridical organ. The court is to consist of seven judges elected in
an individual capacity from among jurists of the highest moral au-
thority and of recognized competence in the field of human rights.235
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms made no reference to possible conflict of
interests between the judge's position in his home state and his po-
sition as an independent international jurist. In Europe, this over-
sight had to be remedied in the court's rules of procedure. No judge
may be a member of a government or hold a post or practice a
profession which is likely to affect public trust in his independent
adjudication.23 With this precedent, the American treaty carefully
stipulated that the position of judge of the court is incompatible with
any other activity that might affect the court's independence or
impartiality.237
The judges of the court are never to be held liable for any de-
cisions or opinions issued in the exercise of their functions.23 None-
theless, the treaty recognizes human frailty involving misfeasance or
malfeasance in office by a judge or a member of the commission.
The General Assembly of the OAS, at the request of the commission
or the court, may determine sanctions against members of the com-
mission or judges of the court when there are justifiable grounds for
such action. A two-thirds majority vote of the member states of
the OAS shall be required for a decision in the case of members
of the commission. In the case of judges of the court, a two-thirds
majority vote of the ratifying states is required. 9
The judges of the court are to receive diplomatic immunities
234 P.A.U., F=rH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Santiago, Chile, Aug., 1959 (OEA/Ser. C/II.5).
235 OA.S. CONVENTION, ch. 8.
236 A.L. DEL Russo, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUvm" RIGHTS 107 (1971).
237 OA.S. CONVENTION, art. 71.
238 Id. art. 70, para. 2.
239 Id. art. 73.
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and diplomatic privileges and are to be paid a salary and provided
with travel allowances.2 40 These financial arrangements are to be
determined in the budget of the OAS, which also shall include the
expense of the court and its secretariat. The court is to draw up its
own budget which must be submitted to the General Assembly for
approval.241
No two judges may be nationals of the same state.242 They are
to be elected by ratifying states via a majority vote on a secret
ballot. Each ratifying state may nominate three candidates, at least
one of the three a national of another state.243 Judges are to be
elected for six years with the possibility of re-election for an addi-
tional six year term. A judge who is a national of a state involved
in a case before the court retains his right to hear the case. Pre-
sumably, if he has a personal interest in the case or has previously
acted as counsel, prosecuting attorney, or judge in the case, judicial
ethics would dicate his withdrawal, although the treaty makes no
such stipulation. If another state is involved in the case, it may
appoint a person to serve on the court as an ad hoc judge. If among
the judges there are no nationals of the state or states involved in
a case, each state may appoint an ad hoc judge. Five judges consti-
tute a quorum for transaction of the business of the court.244
The court is given the power to appoint its own secretary, es-
tablish its secretariat, draw up its statute to be submitted to the
General Assembly for approval, and adopt its own rules of pro-
cedure.245
Under the heading of "Jurisdiction and Functions, ' 246 the
court's jurisdiction is limited to member states which have recognized
the jurisdiction of the court as binding, ipso facto, on all matters
relating to the interpretation or application of the convention. Such
recognition may be made unconditionally, on the condition of reci-
procity, for a specific period, or for a specific case.
The court also has a consultative function. Any organ of the
OAS as well as any member state of the OAS (thus it is not limited
to signatories of the convention) may request from the court an
interpretation of the American convention or any other convention
concerning the protection of human rights in the American states.
This would include an interpretation of the UN covenants. A mem-
240 Id. art. 70, para. 1; art. 72.
241 Id. art. 72.
242 Id. art. 52, para. 2.
243 Id. art. 53.
244 Id. art. 55.
245 Id. arts. 58, 59, 60.
246 Id. ch. 8, § 2.
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ber of the OAS may also request an opinion of the court regarding
the compatibility of any of its domestic laws with these international
instruments.
Would such consultation fall within the concept of "jurisdic-
tion" of the court? The jurisdictional clause declares that ratifying
states will accept as binding all decisions relating to the interpre-
tation of the convention. Yet, the treaty clearly states that the
court's jurisdiction covers only states party to the convention which
have accepted the court's jurisdiction. If it is argued that this con-
sultation is merely a "function" of the court and cannot be consid-
ered jurisdictional because there is no case or controversy, the log-
ical conclusion must be that the opinion of the court in either case
must be completely non-binding on members and non-members
alike. It would be contrary to international law to demand that non-
ratifying states be bound by an advisory opinion; nor could the
court require that the United Nations accept its interpretation of
the international covenants on human rights. Only when treaty
interpretation falls within the context of a case or controversy
would ratifying states be bound by the Court's interpretation.
In the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the court established is given
no consultative power.247 Therefore, questions of treaty interpreta-
tion are always binding on the accepting parties for they must arise
in the context of the court's jurisdiction.
Unlike the European treaty, the OAS treaty contains no provi-
sion stating that a dispute as to whether the court has jurisdiction
shall be settled by the decision of the court. 48 In view of the role of
questions relating to the court's jurisdiction in cases before the
International Court of Justice, such an omission is incomprehensible.
After a state has accepted the court's jurisdiction, there must
be submission of the dispute to the court either by the state or states
involved or by the commission on human rights and an exhaustion
of the proceedings before the commission as outlined in the treaty.
24
The convention denies the individual petitioner direct access to the
court; consequently, the court's decision making power is in the
nature of appellate jurisdiction. The commission must first have
investigated the merits of the case, made a preliminary adjudication
247 Although Protocol No. 2, opened for signature on May 6, 1963, would amend
the treaty by permitting the European Court the right to render advisory opinions at
the request of the Committee of Ministers on the interpretation of treaties, insuf-
ficient ratifications have been deposited to bring this into being.
248 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 49.
249 O.A.S. CoNvNTi'ox, art. 61.
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as to the admissibility of the complaint, attempted, but failed to
bring about a friendly settlement, and have drawn up a report of
the commission's conclusions, proposals, and recommendations.
Even if all of these prerequisites are fulfilled, apparently it is still
within the commission's discretionary power to decide whether it
will refer a case to the court. In this manner, the convention at-
tempts to rebalance claims relating to this traditional sovereignty
of nations against individual claims that sovereign nations are vio-
lating internationally protected human rights.
The European convention provides an alternative to judicial
settlement by the European court.2 ° If the case is not referred to the
court, the Committee of Ministers, the highest executive and the
inter-governmental organ of the Council of Europe, is given a right
by two-thirds vote to determine whether or not a violation of the
treaty has occurred. If it finds that a state has violated the treaty, it
shall prescribe a period of time during which the defendant state
must take corrective measures.25' This additional procedure was put
into the convention because it was recognized that states might well
ratify the convention but refuse to recognize the jurisdiction of the
court. Disputes found admissible by the European Commission on
Human Rights thus could reach a final decision through the Com-
mittee of Ministers.
The American treaty copies the European convention in that
it requires the regional commission on human rights to appear in
all cases before the court.252 This method was adopted in the Euro-
pean convention as a compromise between those who advocated and
those who were opposed to direct access to the court by an individ-
ual. Although neither treaty clarifies the commission's exact role
here, obviously the commission cannot be considered a party to the
dispute. The commission suffered no injury; it was the individual
concerned who was injured by state action or inaction.
It would be violative of correct judicial procedure to designate
the commission as a party to the suit, because much of the evidence
before the court will be contained in the report of the commission
based on its preliminary proceedings which are quasi-judicial and
arbitral in nature. The role of the European commission before the
European court was explained in the pleadings and in the decision
on preliminary objections in the Lawless case. In the Pleading, it was
stated:
250 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 32.
251 Id. art. 32, paras. 1, 2.
252 O.A.S. CONVENTION, art. 57.
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The Commission does not pursue any interest of its own but the public
interest . ..in the maintenance of Human Rights and freedoms. The
Commission is in no sense an antagonist of the States against which
complaints are made before it. The Commission was intended to, and
does act in all matters with complete impartiality, favouring neither
the State nor the individual complaining against the State .... [T]he
Commission, although not a party to the case, participates in the pro-
ceedings and stands in position intermediate between Government and
the individual .... [W]hen it refers a case to the Court, it does so in
order that the Court may give a decision as to whether or not the Con-
vention has been violated. The Commission will, it is true, have ex-
pressed an opinion on that point .. . [b]ut that opinion has the
character not of a legal decision, but of an expert opinion to provide
the basis for a legally binding decision ... by the Court. The function
of the Commission before the Court ... is not litigious-it is ministe-
rial.2N
In its decision of November 14, 1960, the European court
agreed that individuals are vicariously represented before the court
by the commission. As a defender of public interests, the commis-
sion's main function is to assist the court by placing before it all
of the elements of the case.2 4 This practice is familiar through the
common law concept of amicus curiae.
The court is required to give reasons for its judgment and
judges may issue concurring or dissenting opinions. 55 If the court
finds there was a breach of the convention, it shall then rule that
the victim of the violation be restored to his rights by the respondent
state and, if appropriate, that he be paid a fair compensation for the
denial of his rights. These compensatory damages may be executed
in the country concerned in accordance with domestic procedure
governing the execution of judgments against the state.2 56
In case of a disagreement as to the meaning or scope of the
court's judgment, a party may within ninety days following the
judgment request an interpretation, and the court is required to hand
down such an interpretation. With this exception, the judgment of
the court is final and not subject to appeal.25 7
The treaty declares that "parties to the case shall be notified of
the judgment of the court."25 A person complaining of violation of
his human rights obviously has the greatest interest in the case's
253 "Lawless" Case, Hearing of Oct. 4, 1960 (pleadings, Oral Arguments, Docu-
ments) European Court of Human Rights, pp. 245, 261 (1960-61).
254 "Lawless" Case, Judgment of Nov. 14, 1960 (Preliminary objections and
questions of procedure) European Court of Human Rights, pp. 11-16 (1960-61).
255 O.A.S. CoNvENTiON, art. 66.
256 Id. art. 68, para. 2.
257 Id. art. 67.
258 Id. art. 69.
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outcome, yet is he a "party to the case?" He is not entitled to bring
the case before the court and must be vicariously represented by
the commission. Until the court comes into being, there is no way
of determining whether he may appear before the court if the
commission believes that it would be beneficial. Nor is there any
indication in the treaty that he may, after the commission has
brought the case to the court, make submission through an attorney
of his own choice.
A major weakness in the OAS treaty is its failure to include
measures for implementing the court's decision. Even though na-
tions may agree to abide by all future judicial decisions, when the
moment of truth arrives it is not unknown in the international sphere
that judicial decisions are ignored. The OAS treaty provides no
mandatory sanctions for the explicit purpose of enforcing the court's
judgment. Coercive community measures could be used only if the
failure to fulfill the judgment is such that the majority of the na-
tions of the OAS feel it falls within the Rio Treaty's provision re-
lating to a fact or situation that might endanger the peace of the
Americas. But, even then, member-states may fail to implement such
OAS decisions or fail to do so fully. Even with a judicial determina-
tion of a denial of human rights, there is no assurance that the in-jured party will receive reparation or that the guilty state will cease
and desist.
As soon as eleven states have deposited their instruments of
ratification or adherence, the Inter-American Convention shall come
into force. States ratifying may not denounce the treaty for five
years; thereafter, upon a year's notice in advance, the state may
indicate it will no longer be bound by the instrument. The treaty
points out that such denunciation will not release the state from
treaty obligations with respect to any violation that took place prior
to the effective date of denunciation.259
CONCLUSION
When it is realized that listed among the non-signatories of the
American convention on Human Rights are such states as Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and the United States-the largest and most
powerful nations in the hemisphere-the outlook for acceptance of
a binding international obligation by all members of the OAS to re-
spect human rights seems rather bleak. And even though twelve na-
tions did sign the Pact of San Jos6, one cannot be sanguine about
a quick collection of the eleven ratifications required to bring the
treaty into force.
259 Id. art. 78.
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Some will be reluctant to ratify the convention because they
fear the issue of human rights may become a tool of power politics.
When political animosity exists between governments, attacks based
on the high plane of alleged denial of human rights have considera-
able propaganda effect which is often hard to overcome. On the other
side of the coin, a government may wish to close its eyes to gross
repressions of human rights by other nations for reasons of political
expediency, particularly if such repressions occur within the terri-
tory of friendly powers.
The signing of the convention may, on the part of some, have
been a cynical thing, prompted by the recognition that the propa-
ganda effect emanating from being on the side of the angels-in the
front line battling for human rights-comes at the time of signing
the treaty, not at some later ratification date.
A signatory of a human rights convention may be vocal in sup-
port of the need for international protection of human rights in
neighboring states. But these same nations when faced with the
realization that ratification will make the proclaimed human rights
available to their own citizens via international action within their
own boundaries, quickly revert to that most powerful emotional
appeal in the Americas, the ban on non-intervention in internal and
external affairs. Ratification is thus forgotten.
An introspective study of the magnitude of human rights prob-
lems within a country may bring reluctance on the part of that
country's rulers to ratify what has been signed because knowledge
that their human rights problems are so interwoven into the coun-
try's political and social patterns brings with it knowledge that any
solution of these problems can be obtained only by a revolutionary
shake up in the existing power structure. Ratification would then be
the equivalent to signing one's own death warrant-something most
ruling elite are reluctant to do.
Moreover, some nations of this hemisphere have experienced dis-
ruptive encounters with broad grants of civil and political rights, and
the leaders have become wary. In the present stage of their political
and economic development, the scales of wisdom tip in favor of
internal order and peace as against extensive popular participation
in the political process as demanded by the OAS human rights
treaty.
Realistic statesmen find-with a tinge of regret perhaps-that,
on the whole, citizens of one nation are not vitally interested in the
human rights problems of other nations. Only where there is a very
intensive and concerted effort to arouse the populace on behalf of
repressed foreigners do international human rights issues ever be-
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come imperative issues in internal affairs. Faced with such apathy,
most statesmen prefer to let sleeping dogs lie.
In spite of this pessimistic outlook, one should not be com-
pletely disheartened. It may take decades before a binding agree-
ment is widely accepted throughout the hemisphere, but the fact
that the rights have been agreed upon in principle must radiate
some pressure on all American governments to indulge in self-
analysis. And self-analysis may bring about improvement in human
rights endeavors internally.
The brightest spot in the hemispheric human rights picture is
undoubtedly the American Commission on Human Rights. Its mem-
bers have shown a dedication far beyond the call of duty. Their im-
partiality and independence is unquestioned. They have combined
the innovative rationalizing legal skills of a John Marshall, the
personal courage of a Simon Bolivar, and the high integrity and
far-sightedness of a Don Pedro Segundo. They are undeterred by
the recognition that the attainment of a reasonable protection of
major human rights in every hemispheric nation is probably un-
achievable in their lifetime. In their unending prodding, pleading,
and persuading, they may not have immediate success, but they
are sowing for the future. They are creating throughout the hemi-
sphere-particularly among its youth-an awareness of the dangers
inherent in continual denial of human rights.
As this awareness spreads within the borders of each of the
American nations, it may in the long run be the most productive pro-
tector of human rights. For, as has so often been reiterated, human
rights protection at the international level can never be as effective
as the insistent and widespread demands of citizens domestically
that governmental oppression must be ended.
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